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1. INTRODUCTION

Recent legislation changing rules governing civil actions in Mississippi will
be expected to reduce the number of civil actions filed in the state and, too,
the amount of compensation paid to injured tort plaintiffs. Apparently responding
to the public will for change in the tort law, the 1989 Mississippi Legislature
reached controversial compromises affecting three areas of civil practice: limitations on joint and several liability, 1 reduction of statutes of limitations, 2 and
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 3 With this legislation Mississippi
joined the majority of American jurisdictions which have begun restructuring
compensatory rules in civil actions.
Nationally, tort reform has moved swiftly through state legislatures. Elimination of the collateral source rule, 4 limitations of the amount of recoverable
damages for the plaintiff, 5 and limitations on the extent of a defendant's joint
liability 6 have been common. Shortened statutes of limitations, statutes of re1. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (Supp. 1989).
2. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989).

3. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-7 (Supp. 1989).
4. S. CARROLL, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORMS, 56-89 (Rand Publication Series No.

R-3554-1CJ, 1987) [hereinafter CARROLL] (listing statutes changing collateral source rule); O'Connell, Balanced
Proposalsfor Product Liability Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317, 318 (1987)[hereinafter O'Connell, Balanced
Proposals].
5. CARROLL, supra note 4, at 52-56 (listing statutes).
6. Pressler & Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Casefor Reform, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 651,656-60
nn.27-31 (1988) (listing by state statutory reforms of joint and several liability).
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pose, " and limited tolling provisions I have likewise been enacted by state legislatures. Proponents argue that these provisions are reasoned democratic responses
to the tort explosion in general and often to the medical malpractice insurance
crisis in particular. Concerns about contingent fees of plaintiffs' counsel have
prompted proposals to limit their recoverable fees, without correspondingly limiting the amount defense counsel may receive or the defendant may otherwise
spend in defense of a tort action. I These provisions allegedly increase the availability of health care and reduce the cost of American products, thereby making America more competitive.
Critics argue that the reforms sacrifice rights of injured individuals, reduce
product safety, and provide a windfall to insurers as a reward for earlier financial mismanagement. 10 One scholar has suggested that the real tort crisis is
not an increase in the frequency of claims filed but instead that too few meritorious
tort claims are filed. 11 General disagreement prevails regarding the existence
of any insurance crisis, and, even where the rising cost of insurance premiums
is conceded, the increase is variously attributed to an explosion in tort claims
and judgments prompted by the rapid expansion of tort law; 12 or to insurance
company collusion, 13 greed, or incompetence; 14 or to the cyclical nature of
the insurance business. 15
The existence of extensive criticism of the current tort system in this country
7. Note, Medical MalpracticeStatute of Repose: An UnconstitutionalDenial of Access to the Courts,
63 NEB. L. REV. 150 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Medical MalpracticeStatutes of Repose]; Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627, 657-64 (1985)[hereinafter
Note, Federalism Reigns](listing by state statutes of repose); Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose: Judicial Conscience versus Legislative Will, 34 VILL. L. REV. 397
(1989)[hereinafter Note, Judicial Conscience versus Legislative Will]; Comment, Medical Malpracticeand
the Statute of Limitations in Ohio, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 771 (1981).
8. Andrews, Infant Tolling Statutes in Medical Malpractice Cases, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 469 (1984); Harner,
The Repeal of Washington's Infant Tolling Statute in Medical MalpracticeCases:State ConstitutionalChallenges,
22 GONZ. L. REV. 133 (1986/87); Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977); Turkington, Constitutional Limitations on
Tort Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses
to The Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis?32 VILL. L. REV. 1299 (1987); Comment, The Right of Access
to Civil Courts under State ConstitutionalLaw: An Impediment to Modern Reforms, or a Receptacle of Important Substantive and ProceduralRights? 13 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (1982)[hereinafter Comment, Right of
Access]; Note, Federalism Reigns, supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77,
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990 (1985) (upholding constitutionality of statute); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6146 (West 1987).
10. See. e.g., Habush, The Insurance "Crisis:"Reality or Myth ? A Plaintiffs'Law,yer'sPerspective, 64
DEN. U.L. REV. 641 (1988); Nader, The Assault on Injured Victims'Rights, 64 DEN. L. REV. 625 (1988);
Nader, The CorporateDrive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15 (1986); Schroeter &
Rutzick, "Tort Reform'-Being an Insurance Company Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, 22 GONZ.
L. REV. 31 (1986/87).
11. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987)(noting that as many
as 20% of meritorious claims are not filed).
12. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1987).
13. Id.
14. See generally Burrow & Collins, Insurance "Crisis"- Texas Style: The Casefor Insurance Reform,
18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759 (1987); Schroeter & Rutzick, supra note 10, at 34-36.
15. Priest, supra note 12, at 1523.
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suggests that the status quo should not be sanctified. 16 However, proposals for
reform have not yet reached the level of academic, much less political, consensus. The current tort system is believed both to over-compensate some injured
persons and to allow others no recovery at all. 17 Proposals to completely replace
the tort system with a no-fault system of compensation, or a modified no-fault
system, have been tendered; 18 but they have not been adopted outside of the
area of liability for automobile accidents and the workers' compensation context. Consistent with no-fault proposals are suggestions that plaintiffs fault never
be considered, even in comparative negligence states, and that the cost of this
increase in plaintiffs compensation be subtracted by requiring the plaintiff to
offset from his recoverable damages any sum received from a collateral source,
such as his first-party insurer. 19 More recently, a proposal for coupling the
setting of limits on recoverable general damages with the entitlement of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs has been offered, thereby insuring that the
plaintiff will not have to use amounts recovered for economic loss to compensate counsel. 20
The tort system's economic impact has not been overlooked. In a recent study
discussing its impact on those persons whom the tort system should protect,
Professor Priest has noted that the costs of compensating tort victims under our
current third-party insurance system are being shifted disproportionately to the
poor in at least two ways. First, the insurance costs of the tort system are paid
by a fraction of the price of each product which reflects an insurance premium
of the producer. As these costs rise, the poor pay a disproportionate amount
of their income for such premiums in the products they buy. In this manner
the cost-shifting mechanism of the current compensation system may constitute a regressive tax on the poor. 21 Although the insurance premium for each
product is the same regardless of the economic status of the buyer, this disparity causes poorer persons actually to receive less insurance protection for their
16. See, e.g., O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurancefor
Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); O'CONNELL, Balanced Proposals, supra note 4;

O'Connell, A Proposalto Abolish Defendants'Paymentfor Pain and Suffering in Returnfor Payment of Claimants'Attorneys'Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333; O'Connell, A Proposalto Abolish Contributoryand Comparative Fault, with Compensation Savings by Also Abolishing the CollateralSource Rule, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 591; Priest, supra note 12 (observing inefficiencies of compensation system financed by third-party
insurance); Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985); Sugarman, Serious Tort
Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987)[hereinafter Sugarman, Serious Tort Reform]; Sugarman,
Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1987).
17. Sugarman, Serious Tort Reform, supra note 16, at 799-800.
18. SEE, E.G., O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurancefor
Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); Sugarman, Serious Tort Reform, supra note 16,
at 799-800.
19. O'Connell, A Proposalto Abolish Contributoryand ComparativeFault, with Compensation Savings
by Also Abolishing the CollateralSource Rule, 1979 ILL. L.F. 591.
20. Sugarman, Serious Tort Reform, supra note 16, at 834-38.
21. Priest, supra note 12, at 1525.
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premium than wealthier persons. 2 Second, in states unlike Mississippi, where
governmental entities generally are subject to tort liability, those entities are
reducing their potential exposure to liability by eliminating free services, such
as parks and swimming pools, upon which the poor disproportionately rely. 23 In
light of these impacts, it is clear that costs of the tort system, once identified,
are being shifted to persons least able to bear them. Unless such economic analysis
is to be ignored, some change in the compensation system is necessary to more
efficiently allocate costs of the system. 24
Mississippi has not broken new ground in its tort reform measures. 25 Steps
made here have been taken elsewhere, receiving a mixed reaction from affected constituencies. This article will focus only on the changes made by the tort
reform bill to Mississippi's statutes of limitations. Tort reform measures affecting
joint and several liability and interest on judgments, should they survive the
next legislative session, will be discussed in a subsequent article. This article
22. Priest, supra note 12, at 1565, 1585-87. Because damages for past and future economic loss and
for pain and suffering are highly correlated with lost income, the poor receive lower recoveries for their
injuries. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 502 (1987). Professor Priest observes:
This regressive redistributional effect is glaringly inconsistent with judicial intentions as well as with
any coherent and defensible social policy. It is equivalent to charging each worker in the society the
same premium for disability insurance, but compensating those previously earning high incomes more
than those previously earning low incomes. It is equivalent to charging all homeowners the same
fire insurance premium regardless of home value. It is equivalent to not merely the repeal of the
progressive income tax, but also to the repeal coupled with the provision of higher governmental
benefits to those with high incomes.
Id.
23. Priest, supra note 12, at 1586.
24. Professor Priest suggests a greater reliance on first-party insurance systems where risks can more
easily be correlated and premiums more efficiently set. Priest, supra note 12, at 1582-90.
25. H.B. 1171 is referred to as a tort reform bill because that was how the bill was commonly referred
to by legislators and the affected constituencies when the bill was being debated. However, note should be
taken that the reforms in the bill affect civil actions other than tort actions. The official title of the bill, which
is descriptive, is:
AN ACT TO PROVIDE THAT IN CIVIL ACTIONS BASED ON FAULT THAT THE LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY TWO OR MORE PERSONS SHALL BE JOINT ONLY TO
THE EXTENT NECESSARY FOR THE PERSON SUFFERING INJURY, DEATH OR LOSS TO
RECOVER 50% OF HIS RECOVERABLE DAMAGES; TO AMEND SECTION 15-1-36, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO REVISE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO
A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION BY OR ON BEHALF OF A MINOR; TO AMEND SECTION 15-1-49, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO LOWER TO THREE YEARS THE PERIOD
OF LIMITATION FOR ACTIONS FOR WHICH NO OTHER PERIOD OF LIMITATION IS
PRESCRIBED; TO AMEND SECTION 15-1-65, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO PROVIDE
THAT WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES OUTSIDE OF THIS STATE AND AN ACTION THEREON CANNOT BE MAINTAINED IN SUCH FOREIGN JURISDICTION BY REASON OF A LAPSE OF TIME, THEN SUCH ACTION SHALL NOT BE MAINTAINED IN THIS
STATE; TO PROVIDE THAT WHEN SUCH CAUSES OF ACTION ACCRUE IN FAVOR OF
RESIDENTS OF THIS STATE, THIS STATE'S PERIOD OF LIMITATION SHALL APPLY; TO
AMEND SECTION 75-17-7, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, TO PROVIDE THAT ALL JUDGMENTS OR DECREES NOT BASED ON CONTRACT SHALL BEAR INTEREST AT A PER
ANNUM RATE SET BY THE JUDGE FROM A DATE DETERMINED BY SUCH JUDGE TO
BE FAIR; TO REPEAL SECTION 85-5-5, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1972, WHICH PROVIDES
THAT JOINT TORT-FEASORS SHARE EQUALLY IN ANY JUDGMENT RENDERED AGAINST
THEM AND PROVIDES FOR CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORT-FEASORS; AND FOR
RELATED PURPOSES.
H.B. 1171, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Miss. LAWS 19.
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will analyze the effects of the Mississippi statute of limitations reforms and suggest solutions to the interpretive problems which will inevitably arise for the
bench and the bar from the new statutes. The texts of section 15-1-36 and section 15-1-65, in particular, raise several problems regarding how these provisions are to be applied in the courts. This is unfortunate. If statutes of limitations
are to be useful to litigants and counsel, they should give fair and definite notice of when claims must be commenced and when they are barred. These statutes are less than desirable from that point of view. In light of the policies
behind the amendments, I propose interpretations for the revised statutes and
discuss in detail questions regarding their constitutionality.
A. Statutes of Limitations: Purposeful Accommodation of
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Interests?
States seldom have a unified policy regarding compensating persons injured
by the actions or inactions of others. 26 Policies favoring compensation of tort
plaintiffs, for instance, are tempered by contrary policies favoring defendants.
Rules of joint and several liability, which in Mississippi have been modified
in favor of defendants, 27 and of strict product liability clearly favor compensating injured plaintiffs. So, too, the elimination or limitations of defenses such
as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear chance favor plaintiff compensation. 28 However, the continued validity of these and other defenses,
even as limited by judicial opinion or legislative enactment, and the continued
vitality of the concept of fault in negligence actions suggest that policies regarding
compensation are not one-sided in favor of plaintiffs. Compensatory policies
are often compromises which favor neither the plaintiff nor the defendant entirely. 29
In Mississippi, which was one of the first states to eliminate the bar of contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault, conflicting policies regarding compensation are obvious. The Workers' Compensation system 30 is a good
example. Workers' Compensation allows a claimant to be compensated for workrelated injuries and disallows the employer from relying on common-law
defenses. However, the system clearly favors the employer's interest also because
the employer's liability for work-related injuries is limited by the system and
the employer in Mississippi retains the right to fire any employee in retaliation
for filing a claim for compensation. 31
Likewise, statutes of limitations represent a compromise between interests
26. Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 946, 957-958 (1981). See
also Jackson, No Place Like Home: Public Policy and Prudent Practice in the Conflict of Laws, 90 W. VA.

L. REV. 1195 (1988).
27. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (Supp. 1989).
28. Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 957-58.
29. Id.
30. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-1 to -111 (1989).
31. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
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of plaintiffs and of defendants. 32 Statutes of limitations protect the interests
of plaintiffs by affording them the opportunity to prosecute valid claims. 3 These
statutes stimulate prompt action by plaintiffs by penalizing dilatoriness. I Periods
of limitations likewise protect defendants from stale claims which, due to the
passage of time, cannot be adequately investigated because of the loss of evidence or the death or lapse of memory of witnesses. 35 In that sense the statutes promote substantive justice for defendants by preventing plaintiffs' claims
which cannot be effectively defended. 36 By assuring defendants of a definite
time when contested issues, if not litigated, can be considered settled or closed,
the statutes give defendants, and society in general, security by eliminating risk
of belated judgments which would unduly encumber economic activity. 31 Finally, statutes of limitations promote the efficient use of judicial resources
by allowing courts to avoid weighing stale evidence and to devote attention to
matters of greater recency and urgency. 38
To achieve a purposeful compromise between the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants, drafters of statutes of limitations establish time limits which accommodate interests of plaintiffs by giving them some time to commence an
action and which accommodate the defendants' interest in security by creating
a time limit after which the defendants' peace is assured. 39 Invariably, longer
periods of limitations favor the plaintiff and shorter ones, the defendant. Of
course, establishing limitations periods is an arbitrary process, since legislators and legislatures can disagree on how to favor interests of the affected constituencies and since there is no fixed standard by which the fairness of these
statutes can be evaluated.
Because of the inherently arbitrary nature of this type of legislative limitsetting, courts have traditionally recognized that establishing periods of limitations is a political judgment which accommodates competing and conflicting
interests. Until recently, courts have shown considerable deference to legisla32. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 956 (4th Cir. 1984).
33. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limitations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11
(1975).
34. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982); Milhollin, supra note 33, at 10 n.35.
35. Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405, 406 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971); Ester,
Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33, 35 (1962); Sedler, The Erie
Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedurein the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 813, 847
(1962); Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YA.E L.J. 492, 497-98 (1919);
Note, An Interest-Anaylsis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 299,
302 (1974)[hereinafter Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach].
36. Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1979)[hereinafter
Note, Limitation Borrowing].
37. Ester, supra note 35, at 35; Milhollin, supra note 33, at 10; Note, Developments in the Law, Statutes
of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950); Note, Limitation Borrowing, supra note 36, at 1128.
38. Ester, supra note 35, at 36; Milhollin, supra note 33, at 10; Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach,
supra note 35, at 302; Note, Limitation Borrowing, supra note 36, at 1128.
39. Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 203 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
Kohnke v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 144 Wis. 2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988); Milhollin, supra note 33, at 11.
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tures when evaluating challenges to statutes of limitations. 40 The reasons for
this deference were articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chase
41
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson:
Statutes of limitations find their justification in necessity and convenience rather
than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and
the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses
have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. . . .They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the
unjust claim, or the voidable [sic] and unavoidable delay. They have come into
the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent
a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded
as what now is called a 'fundamental' right or what used to be called a 'natural'
right of the individual. He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while
it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by
legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative
control. 42
The recent changes in Mississippi's statutes of limitations, with some exceptions, generally favor the defendant's interest in security and fairness. Shortening of the limitations period in the catch-all limitations statute and reduction
of the tolling period for health care malpractice claims of minors give greater
protection to the defendant, at the expense of the protection previously given
plaintiffs.
Professor Danzon has examined empirically the relation between shortening
statutes of limitations and the frequency of claims under medical malpractice
statutes. 43 Her studies show that there is a direct relationship between reductions in limitations periods and reductions in the number of claims fled." Professor Danzon observed that reductions of the periods of limitations by one year
yield an eight percent reduction in the number of claims filed and a six to seven
percent reduction in claims paid. ,1Reducing statutes of limitations reduces the
number of civil actions filed. Therefore, the legislative aim of reducing the number of claims filed against health care providers in Mississippi could be achieved
by the amendments to the statutes of limitations. However, given the loopholes
40. See infra text accompanying notes 117-58.
41. 325 U.S. 304, reh. denied, 325 U.S. 896 (1945).
42. Id. at 314.
43. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical MalpracticeClaims: New Evidence, 49 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1986)[hereinafter Danzon, New Evidence]; Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reform on the
Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 413 (1987).
44. Danzon, New Evidence, supra note 43, at71-72.
45. Id. Professor Danzon has noted that this is the:
averageeffect of a one-year reduction, measured at the sample mean of roughly five years. The mean
effect cannot be extrapolated indefinitely. For example, since the number of claims filed declines
with years elapsed from the date of injury, reducing a statute from ten years to nine years probably
reduces claims by less than eight percent whereas reducing a statute from four years to three years
may reduce claims by more than eight percent.
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in the amended statutes of limitations which limit their scope and given the fact
that the statutes apply only to claims accruing after July 1, 1989, the effectiveness of these statutes to limit the number of claims filed will be curtailed.
Three statutes of limitations were amended by the tort reform bill. The legislature enacted a special tolling provision for health care malpractice claims of
minors and persons suffering disabilities, section 2 of H.B. 1171, amending
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36. These provisions have become
common in American jurisdictions since the advent of the alleged medical malpractice insurance crisis. 46 Second, the legislature shortened the catch-all statute of limitations from six to three years, section 3 of H.B. 1171, amending
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49. Third, the legislature adopted a
borrowing statute which should finally serve to require application of the statute of limitations from the state where an out-of-state claim accrued, section
3 of H.B. 1171, amending Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-65. These
last two enactments are expected to reduce greatly the number of out-of-state
claims filed in Mississippi's state and federal courts and should increase the
sense of fairness for non-resident defendants who are sued in Mississippi on
claims accruing elsewhere. These amendments will be considered separately
below.
II. MISSISSIPPI CODE

ANNOTATED SECTION

15-1-36

A. HistoricalBackground: Creation of the Special Statute of Limitations
for Tort Claims Against Selected Health Care Providers
Prior to the adoption of section 15-1-36 in 1976, actions against health care
providers were governed by the catch-all six-year statute of limitations of section 15-1-49. Section 15-1-36 established a specific statute of limitations for
claims in tort against "a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse,
pharmacist, optometrist, or chiropractor" arising from the rendering of professional services. Section 15-1-36 provides that claims in tort against the specified health care providers 4 7 for injuries or wrongful death arising out of
professional treatment are untimely unless "filed within two years from the date
the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might
have been first known or discovered." I The scope of section 15-1-36 is noteworthy both for the claims it does control and for those it does not. Wrongful death
claims arising from health care malpractice are controlled by section 15-1-36;
46. See generally Andrews, supra note 8; Harner, supra note 8; Note, Federalism Reigns, supra note
7, at 657 (collecting by state statutes of repose); Note, JudicialConscience versus Legislative Will, 34 VILL.
L. REV. 397 (1989); Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose, supra note 7.
47. Several of these commissions are defined in the Code. MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-33 (1989)(Practice
of medicine defined); § 73-25-25 (1989)(Osteopaths); § 73-9-3 (1989) (Dentists defined); § 73-15-5
(1989)(Nurses defined); § 73-21-73 (1989)(Pharmacists); § 73-19-1 (1989) (Practice of Optometry defined);
§ 73-6-1 (1989)(Practice of chiropractic defined); § 73-27-1 (1989)(Podiatrists defined).
48. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989).
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all other wrongful death claims must be commenced within the period established by section 15-1-49. This is important for two reasons. First, section 15-1-36
has a shorter limitations period than section 15-1-49. Second, section 15-1-36
has tolling provisions which are applicable to wrongful death claims arising
from health care malpractice. There are no tolling provisions applicable to all
other wrongful death claims. 19
Section 15-1-36 is also remarkable because by its express language it controls only claims "in tort" against health care providers. Of course, health care
malpractice claims may sound in tort or in contract, as in the case where the
plaintiff alleges that the health care provider breached a warranty of reasonable
care. Breach of warranty claims for health care malpractice have not been common in Mississippi. 50 However, these claims are generally recognized as viable in other states. 51 The measure and manner of computation of damages for
contract actions are different than those for tort claims. Also the amount of
recoverable contract damages is generally less than for tort
claims. 52 Nevertheless, warranty claims for health care malpractice, if allowed
in Mississippi courts, will be attractive to plaintiffs because the period of limitations and the general tolling provisions will provide plaintiffs in contract actions more time in which to commence actions. 53
49. Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So. 2d 491 (Miss. 1983); Note, Tons, 54 Miss. L.J. 169 (1984).
The court held in Arender that when a claim for wrongful death arising under MISS.CODE ANN. § 11-7-13,
amended by § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1989), accrues as to one adult beneficiary, it accrues as to all other beneficiaries,
including infant beneficiaries. Arender, 431 So. 2d at 493. That conclusion was compelled by two facts unique
to wrongful death cases. First, as the court noted, there is no savings provision for infants in wrongful death
cases. Second, the court noted the wrongful death statute specifically provides that there is but one claim
for wrongful death. Id. at 493. Of course, § 15-1-36 does provide a tolling provision for wrongful death
claimants whose claim arises from health care malpractice. It is not clear, however, how the tolling provisions of § 15-1-36 will be interpreted in light of the principle, stated in Arender, that there is only one claim
for wrongful death. For instance, in cases where some of the beneficiaries are without a parent or guardian
but others are not entitled to any tolling protection, it is unclear whether the tolling provisions of § 15-1-36
will toll the period of limitation for the beneficiaries entitled to tolling or whether the court will continue
to adhere to the rule that when the period of limitation runs as to one beneficiary, it runs as to all. What
is clear is that in cases where all beneficiaries are entitled to tolling protection under § 15-1-36, the tolling
provisions of § 15-1-36 will protect such beneficiaries. For instance, in cases where two infant beneficiaries
are both under six years of age, the tolling provisionsof § 15-1-36 will protect such beneficiaries in a manner in which they would not be protected if their wrongful death claim arose from other than health care
malpractice.
50. See Phillips v. Hull, 516 So. 2d 488 (Miss. 1987). Medical malpractice count sounding in breach
of warranty which alleged "defendants warranted safety and care . . . and warranted proper delivery of the
child" properly dismissed on motion for summary judgment as allegations were insufficient to develop a
basis for claims. Id. at 494. However, the court did not suggest that sounding malpractice claims in breach
of warranty can never establish a viable claim in Mississippi. Id.
51. See, e.g., Totsky v. Henry Ford Hosp., 169 Mich. App. 286, 425 N.W.2d 531 (1988) (valid claim
in contract requires written agreement reciting terms essential to contract and signed by defendant); Brice
v. Westchester Community Health Plan, 531 N.Y.S.2d 621, 143 A.D.2d 170 (App. Div. 1988) (recognizing viability of contract action but dismissing claim for lack of factual allegations to support claim); Koschnik
v. Smejkal, 96 Wis. 2d 145, 291 N.W.2d 574 (1980) (claim may sound in either tort or contract).
52. Murray v. University of Pa. Hosp., 340 Pa. Super. 401, 490 A.2d 839 (1985).
53. Breach of warranty claims arising from professional services will be governed by the three-year period
of limitation in amended § 15-1-49, which, of course, is one year longer than the period of limitations in
amended § 15-1-36. Tolling provisions applicable to such actions are found in §§ 15-1-57 and 15-1-59.
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Some courts have interpreted special malpractice statutes of limitations to apply
to contract actions. The South Carolina Supreme Court, 5, for instance, has
held that the statute which controls all claims for damages against health care
providers was also meant to control contract claims. However, given the fact
that Mississippi's statute of limitations specifically applies to claims "in tort,"
such an expansive reading of the scope of the statute (which in effect would
make claims "in tort" mean all claims "in tort or contract") would not be justified. The Mississippi Supreme Court has established that when determining legislative intent it will look first to the express language of the statute. 55 In looking
at the statute's express provisions, the court will be compelled to hold that section 15-1-36 does not control warranty claims arising from health care malpractice. 56 This is probably so, even though the court has, in another context,
declared its animosity toward artful pleading by plaintiffs who sound product
liability claims in contract rather than, or in addition to, sounding those claims
in tort. 57
Adoption of section 15-1-36 in 1976 effected three important changes in the
computation of limitations periods for actions against health care providers. First,
and most obviously, the limitations period was shortened from six years to
two. 58 But for the other changes in the statute, this shortening of the limitations period probably would have decreased the number of claims filed against
these health care providers.
Second, and more importantly for reducing or increasing the number of malpractice claims filed, the 1976 statute incorporated the so-called "discovery rule"
for determining when a claim accrues. 59 Under this discovery rule, a claim
does not accrue and, therefore, the two-year statute of limitations does not begin to run, until the plaintiff patient actually discovers, or with reasonable diligence might have discovered, the alleged act or omission causing injury or death.
Adoption of the discovery rule legislatively overruled earlier medical malpractice cases in Mississippi, which held that under section 15-1-49, absent some
showing that the physician fraudulently concealed the existence of a claim from
the patient, a claim for medical malpractice accrued on the date of the physi54. Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987).
55. Thornhill v. Ford, 56 So. 2d 23, 30 (Miss. 1952) (recognizing general rule of statutory construction
that intent of legislature found primarily in language employed in statutes). See also Moore Bayou Water
Ass'n Inc. v. Town of Jonestown, 628 F. Supp. 1367, 1369 (N.D. Miss. 1986) ("While this court must
seek to effectuate the legislative intent in construing a particular statute, primary reliance must be placed
on the language of the statute itself.").
56. This assumes that such claims remain viable in Mississippi. If they are not, this point is moot.
57. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986). See infra text accompanying notes
186-92.
58. MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989).
59. The discovery rule is incorporated in the language "shall or with reasonable diligence might have
been known or discovered."
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cian's act or omission. 60
Read literally, the discovery rule provisions of section 15-1-36 provide that
malpractice claims accrue at the time the patient is or should be aware of the
health care provider's acts or omissions. Since, as the Mississippi Supreme Court
has noted, 61 most patients are aware of the treatment given to them by their
physicians, malpractice claims would accrue at the date of treatment under a
literal construction of the statute. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court in
recent opinions 62 has given an increasingly liberal construction to the discovery provisions of the statute in favor of injured patients so that, even in cases
where the patient admits knowledge of her physician's conduct, the patient's
claim does not accrue until the plaintiff is aware of her injury. In Tribou v.
Gunn, 63 for instance, a patient's action, commenced in 1980 for medical malpractice for misdiagnosis of cancer, was held timely even though the alleged
misdiagnosis occurred over a series of consultations beginning in 1972 and extending until May 1978, when the defendant physician finally diagnosed the
cancer. Apparently, Tribou could not deny that she was aware of her physician's acts or omissions. Under a literal reading of section 15-1-36, therefore,
Tribou's action, which was commenced in May 1980, but based on consultations prior to May 1978, would have been barred because her claim would have
accrued when she discovered her physician's actions. However, while aware
of her doctor's actions and inactions beginning in 1972, Tribou did not discover
until a correct diagnosis of her cancer was made by the defendant in May of
1978 that she had been injured and that her doctor's earlier actions were in fact
negligent. The court rejected a literal construction of section 15-1-36 and held
that Tribou's claim did not accrue until the correct diagnosis was made because
until that time there was nothing to indicate to the patient that she had cancer. 64
Although the court in Smith v. Sanders 11 stated again that the plaintiffs claim
accrued upon discovery of injury, 66 the court, in dicta, further liberalized the
60. Wilder v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651 (1955). Accord Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d. 91 (Miss. 1967)(dicta)(malpractice claim accrues as of the date of treatment, but
a claim for wrongful death caused by medical treatment accrues under wrongful death statute at the time
of death, not at time of medical treatment).
61. Parham v. Moore, No. 58437, slip op. (Miss. May 3, 1989); Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So. 2d 184
(Miss. 1988); Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1987); Smith v. Sanders, 485 So. 2d 1051 (Miss.
1986); Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984); Tribou v. Gunn, 410 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982).
62. Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So. 2d. 184 (Miss. 1988); Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1987);
Smith v. Sanders, 485 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 1986); Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984); Tribou
v. Gunn, 410 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982).
63. 410 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982).
64. This principal, that the triggering event for accrual of a malpractice claim is discovery of injury,
rather than discovery of the act of omission causing the same, was stated more plainly in Pittman v. Hodges,
462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984), where the court rejected any literal reading of the statute that claims accrue
when the act or omission occurs. The court wrote that "in Mississippi the principle ... to determine when
the statute of limitations begins to run does not invariably focus upon the date on which the act or omission
occurs; the focus is rather upon when the plaintiff discovers the injury by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence." Id. at 333.
65. 485 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 1986).
66. Id. at 1053.
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discovery rule in favor of injured patients by suggesting that more than merely
the injury must be discovered by the patient. Justice Sullivan wrote for the court:
The focus is upon the time that the patient discovers, or should have discovered
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he probably has an actionable injury. The operative time is when the patient can reasonably be held to have
knowledge of the injury itself, the cause of the injury, and the causative relationship between the injury and the conduct of the medical practitioner. 67
Under this dictum a medical malpractice claim does not accrue to a patient who
is aware of both an injury and the acts or omissions of his health care provider
unless that patient is aware of the causative relation between the act and the
injury. 68 Clearly, this standard greatly expands the literal accrual provisions
of section 15-1-36 in favor of the injured patient and at the expense of the defendant health care provider and makes Mississippi's rule for accrual of medical
malpractice claims closer to those of states which require that a plaintiff be aware
of all, or almost all, of the elements of his claim in order for a malpractice
claim to accrue. What this interpretation lacks in faithfulness to the language
of the statute, it makes up for in protecting the allegedly injured plaintiffs at
the expense of health care providers and their insurers.
Thus interpreted by the Missisissippi Supreme Court, section 15-1-36 is unlike many special statutes governing periods for commencement of malpractice claims which were enacted in the last two decades in response to the
malpractice crisis. Section 15-1-36 is a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose. 6 Unlike statutes of repose for medical malpractice actions, which
usually commence the period of limitations on the date of treatment or nontreatment, section 15-1-36 commences the period of limitations on the date the
claim is or might be discovered. As interpreted by the Mississippi Supreme
Court, claims accrue under section 15-1-36 upon discovery of the health care
provider's act or omission, of the injury, and of the causative relation between
the two and not from the date of the alleged act or omission by the health care
provider. Thus interpreted, section 15-1-36 is a period of limitations which cannot
67. Id. at 1052.
68. Parham v. Moore, No. 58437, slip op. (Miss. May 3, 1989).
69. The difference between statutes of limitations and of repose was described by a Florida District Court
of Appeals as follows:
[A] statute of limitations bars enforcement of an accrued cause of action whereas a statute of repose
not only bars an accrued cause of action, but will also prevent the accrual of a cause of action where
the final element necessary for its creation occurs beyond the time period established by the statute....
A second distinction may be made with reference to the event from which time is measured. A
statute of limitation runs from the date the cause of action arises; that is, the date on which the final
element (ordinarily, damages, but it may also be knowledge or notice) essential to the existence of
a cause of action occurs. The period of time established by a statute of repose commences to run
from the date of an event specified in the statute, such as delivery of goods, closing on a real estate
sale or the performance of a surgical operation. At the end of the time period the cause of action
ceases to exist.
Carr v. Broward County, 505 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989).
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bar a claim before it is discovered. This is important because most successful
constitutional challenges to the special malpractice statutes governing the period in which claims could be commenced have involved statutes of repose, for
which some courts have shown great animosity. 70
As important to plaintiffs as the expansive interpretation given to the accrual
provision of section 15-1-36 is that the jury determines when a patient discovered, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered, his
physician's acts, his consequent injury, and the causative relation between the
two. 71 Only when reasonable minds cannot differ on the discovery issue may
the issue be taken from the jury on motion for summary judgment, for directed
verdict, or for peremptory instruction. 72 As such, determining the date the plaintiff with reasonable diligence should have discovered the necessary elements
of her claims and, therefore, the date her claim accrues is for the jury to decide
under section 15-1-36.
B. Tolling Provisions in the 1976 Statute
The third change in calculating time limits on malpractice claims was effectuated in 1976 by including a tolling provision for persons who are either under the age of sixteen or of unsound mind at the time a claim accrues. 13 Under
the 1976 version of section 15-1-36, a person suffering from either of these
disabilities at the time a claim accrued had two years to file a claim following
the cessation of the disability or following death, whichever occurred first. This
two-year time limit could be extended, however, under section 15-1-55 by not
more than an additional one year in cases involving patients who died following accrual of their claim and before the limitations period expired. 1,
The tolling provision, by its terms, applies only to persons who suffer from
the disability of age or unsoundness of mind at the time the claim accrued. As
written, the tolling provision excludes from its scope a person who, on the date
the action accrues, suffers no disability, but who becomes incompetent on the
day following accrual and suffers that disability for the remainder of the limita70. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
71. Smith v. Saunders, 485 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 1986). Accord Parham v. Moore, No. 58437 slip op.
(Miss. May 3, 1989).
72. Smith, 485 So. 2d at 1055.
73. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989). Subsequent to the adoption of this saving provision in
§ 15-1-36, a general savings provision was adopted to suspend the operation of all statutes of limitations
under title 15 of the Codi. Miss CODE ANN. § 15-1-59 (Supp. 1989).
74. MISS. CODE. ANN § 15-1-55 (1972) is a survival statute for personal claims. An executor or administrator has one year following the death of a person possessing a personal claim against another to commence an action on that claim. Essentially, § 15-1-55 creates the possibility of extending the limitations
period on such a claim by one year. For instance, for a person who suffers a disability of minority (under
age sixteen) or unsoundness of mind and who dies following cessation of that disability and accrual of the
claim, the executor of that person's estate would have one year to commence such an action. Under § 15-1-36,
for example, in cases where a malpractice claim accrues to a minor while under the age of sixteen, the limitations period will not begin to run against the minor until the minor's sixteenth birthday. Should the minor
die before his eighteenth birthday, the claim would survive in favor of his estate, which would have an additional year following the minor's death to commence his action.
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tions period. If the incompetency did not exist at the time the claim accrued,
but instead occurred only after accrual, the saving provisions of section 15-1-36
could not be invoked to toll the limitations period. This interpretation follows
the general rule that following accrual of an action supervening incompetency
will not suspend the operation of a statute of limitations. 7r
To date, the only exception to this rule recognized in Mississippi is found
in Pannell v. Glidewel176 where the plaintiff became incompetent hours after
and as a result of a battery by the defendant. Even though the incompetency
occurred after the battery, the statute's operation was suspended 77 because the
incompetency occurred on the same day the claim accrued as a result of the
battery. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, interpreting a similar tolling provision in a Texas statute, likewise recognized that, once the limitations
period begins to run, "it continues to do so even should one of the disabilities
that would toll it arise in the meantime."' 8 The Fifth Circuit found that the
only exception to this rule was the one established in Pannell, where mental
incompetency results directly from the injury and arises on the same day. 79 Such
an interpretation seems unfair because it allows the tolling provisions to operate in favor of the person who becomes of unsound mind the day before the
claim accrues, but not in favor of the person who becomes of unsound mind
the day after accrual. 80 However, this treatment of persons of unsound mind,
while arbitrary, is no less arbitrary than statutes of limitation in general, which
will bar a meritorious claim filed one day after the limitations period has run,
but not a non-meritorious one filed the day before the limitations period has
expired.
C. Amendments to Section 15-1-36 in H.B. 1171
Section 2 of H.B. 1171 made two changes of substance in section 15-1-36,
both involving the tolling provisions in the statute. First, the period of limitations will begin to run against injured patients when they reach age six rather
than age sixteen. That amendment obviously is to reduce the period of exposure
75. See, e.g., De Arnaud v. United States, 151 U.S. 483 (1894); Pannell v. Glidewell, 146 Miss. 565,
568, 111 So. 571, 572 (1927) ("[The statute] simply provides that the disability of unsoundness of mind
must have existed 'at the time at which the cause of action accrued.' .
And no doubt that is the general
rule, especially under statutes like ours.").
76. 146 Miss. 565, 111 So. 571 (1927).
77. Id. The court in Pannell suggested that because the incompetency occurred on the same day the claim
accrued, although obviously after the battery, the incompetency was existing at the time the claim accrued
because the law did not recognize a period shorter than a single day. Id. However, clearly the exception
of Pannell which treats incompetency resulting from tortious conduct as incompetency at the time the claim
accrued would be extended beyond the day the claim accrued.
78. Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1975); accord Joy v. Joy, 156 S.W.2d
547, 550 (Tex. App. 1941).
79. Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 972 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. However, this construction is consistent with the long-held principle of statutory construction that
provisions creating exceptions should be narrowly construed against the person in whose favor the exception
operates.
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for health care providers on the so-called long-tail liability8 1 and thus the number
of older claims filed. The amendment is a response to the rising cost of insurance for persons facing so-called long-tail risk which, particularly in the case
of physicians, has been documented. 82 The measure should also reduce the
sense of unfairness which health care providers feel when sued for injuries which
occurred as many as twenty years prior to the filing of an action. Finally, the
amendment may be aimed at preventing actual or potential loss of health care
services by health care providers who restrict professional services for fear of
risk exposure or because of the high cost of insuring against risk. 83
House Bill 1171 also expanded the tolling provision of section 15-1-36 by
providing that the limitations period will not run against minors who are without
parent or legal guardian at the time "the cause of action shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered." Under subsection
(3), the period of limitations will not run against a minor who is without parent
or legal guardian until the minor shall have a parent or legal guardian or until
the minor dies, whichever first occurs. In no event under subsection (3) does
the period of limitations run against a minor until age six.
Under section 15-1-36 as amended, therefore, the two-year period of limitations for claims against the enumerated health care providers begins to run when
the claim is or would be discovered with reasonable diligence. However, in
cases where the injured patient is under age six, of unsound mind, or without
a parent or guardian at the time the claim would accrue, then the statute will
not run until all applicable disabilities 8 4 have ceased, or the patient dies,
81. Professor Priest has noted the breakdown of the insurance function for physicians, such as obstetricians and gynecologists who face long-tail liability. Priest supra note 12.
82. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE COSTS INCREASED BUT
VARIED AMONG PHYSICIANS & HOSPITALS 27 (1976); Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice:Further Developments and A PreliminaryReport Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499, 501-05 (1989); Danzon,
New Evidence, supra note 43, at 57-58; Priest, supra note 12, at 1558. There is, of course, considerable
disagreement among courts, health care providers, and lawyers regarding the reality of the insurance crisis.
Compare AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80's, Reports 1, 2, & 3 (1984) with ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ISWRONG-THERE is No MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

CRISIS (1985). Compare, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 79 11. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (recognizing
existence of crisis is generally conceded) with Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93 (R.I. 1983) (proper
for lower court to take judicial notice of fact that no malpractice crisis existed in 1981).
83. This legislative motive is generally conceded by courts when considering special statutes of limitations for malpractice actions even by courts which do not concede that such legislation can achieve the goal
of increasing health care availability. See and compare Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. Inc., 273 Ind. 374,
387, 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (1980)("Legislature undoubtedly moved because of its appraisal that the services
of health care providers were being threatened and curtailed contrary to the health interests of the community because of the high costs and unavailability of liability insurance.") with Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz.
69, 85, 688 P.2d 961, 976 (1984)(doubting "factual premise" for argument that high premiums work an
economic hardship on physicians and that special statute of limitations should be sustained as necessary relief
measure for health care providers). On the relationship between beliefs of health care providers and the availability of health care, see infra text accompanying notes 152-55.
84. Again, if a patient is under age six and without a parent or guardian at the time the claim would
have accrued, then the period of limitations does not begin to run until expiration of both disabilities.
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whichever occurs first. 85 The amendment therefore enlarges the scope of the
tolling provision by adding a third disability which will trigger tolling, but also
reduces the tolling provision for persons with a disabilty of age by tolling the
limitations period only until age six rather than age sixteen.
D. Harmonizing the Discovery Rule for Accrual with the Amended Tolling
Provisions of the Statute: Who Must Discover the Existence of a Claim?
The discovery rule for accrual of claims remains unchanged by H.B. 1171.
However, because of an unfortunate choice of language in the text of subsection (3), which was added to section 15-1-36 in the recent amendments, that
accrual provision and the tolling provisions will have to be harmonized in order to accomplish the apparent purpose of the amendment.
An example will illustrate potential problems involving the accrual and tolling provisions of the amended statute. Assume a three-year-old infant suffers
an injury due to medical malpractice. Under subsection (2) of H.B. 1171, a
tolling provision, the earliest date the limitations period could begin to run on
the claim is the infant's sixth birthday. 86 However, under the accrual provision of subsection (1), which was not changed by the tort reform amendment,
in no event will the statute of limitations begin to run until the "alleged act,
omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first
known or discovered." 87 In order to commence the limitations period, who must
discover the existence of the claim within the meaning of the accrual provision
in subsection (1)?
If the minor after reaching age six must discover the existence of her claim
in order to commence running of the statute, the claim may not accrue for several
years after the termination of the tolling period. Even after age six, most young
children will not be able to discover the negligent act of the health care provider,
the injury, and the causative relation between the two. If the accrual provisions
of subsection (1) are construed to require the injured infant patient to use reasonable diligence to discover the existence of the claim, then the period of limitations on many claims will not begin to run until the minor reaches majority.
That would clearly defeat the effect of the amendment which shortened the tolling
period for minors.
It seems reasonable to suggest that in cases involving infants under age six,
the statute should be interpreted as requiring the claim to accrue when the parent or guardian discovers, or with reasonable diligence might discover, the ex85. As noted earlier, if the patient dies after the period of limitations has begun to run, under § 15-1-55,
the action survives and the representative of the patient's estate has one additional year in which to commence the action, if less than one additional year remains on the period of limitations. If more than one
year remains on the period of limitations under § 15-1-36, then a claim must be brought in that remaining period.
86. Of course, the example assumes no other applicable disabilities which would prevent the statute from
running against the claim and assumes that the claim accrued after July 1, 1989.
87. As noted above, the Mississippi Supreme Court has interpreted discovery of "alleged act, ommission or neglect" to mean discovery of the act, the injury, and the causative relation between the two. See
supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
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istence of the claim. Therefore, when the claim is barred as to the parent or
legal guardian, the claim is barred as to the injured infant, whether or not the
infant was aware or with the existence of reasonable diligence might be aware
of the existence of the claim. This interpretation of the accrual provisions is
compelled for four reasons.
First, it would effectuate the purposes behind reducing the tolling period from
sixteen to six years. To interpret the accrual provision as requiring the infant
at age six to discover the existence of the claim would effectively defeat the
reduction of the tolling provision.
Second, in Mississippi, where minors lack capacity to sue, 88 it is anomalous
to suggest that claims of minors, which minors cannot litigate, cannot accrue
until the minor discovers the same.
Third, the fact that section 15-1-36 states that a limitations period may actually begin to run when a minor reaches age six strongly suggests that the legislature recognized that claims could accrue at or before that time. Since it is
doubtful that a rational legislature was contemplating that minors of age six
could be aware of the existence of a legal claim, for claims to actually accrue
when a minor was at such tender age, the discovery of the claim must have
to be made by a parent or legal guardian. Those courts in other states which
have bothered to consider this issue have all interpreted similar provisions to
mean that claims of minors accrue when a reasonable parent or guardian discovers or should discover such claims. 89
Fourth, interpreting the accrual provisions to mean that the claim accrues
when the parent or guardian is or should be aware of the infant's claim helps
to make sense of the new subsection (3) which was added to section 15-1-36
in H.B. 1171. Under subsection (3), if an infant has no parent or legal guardian when a claim "shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known,"
the statute is tolled until the infant obtains a parent or legal guardian. Addition
of this subsection to protect children without parents or guardians would make
little sense if a claim could not accrue until the minor was aware of the claim.
If accrual is postponed until the minor is or should be aware of the claim, subsection (3) would be unnecessary because for all practical purposes claims simply
would not accrue until the minor reached majority anyway.
The fact that subsection (3) speaks of the possibility that a claim may accrue
88. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n v. Moyo, 525 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1988); Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816, 826, 138 So. 593, 595 (1932)("[I]nfants and persons of unsound mind are disabled
under the law to act for themselves.").
89. Kite v. Campbell, 142 Cal. App. 3d 793, 804, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363, 369 (1983), overruled on other
grounds, Torres v. County of Los Angeles, 209 Cal. 3d 325, 257 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1989) ("Suits on behalf
of a minor must now be brought within three years of the time of the alleged malpractice, unless the minor's
parent or guardian has not discovered, or through use of reasonable diligence would not be expected to discover, the injury and its negligent cause."). Accord Carr v. Broward County, 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989);
Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453 A.2d, 342, 346 (1982). See also Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp.
152, 155 (D. Utah 1984), revd, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986) (interpretation required by language of specific
statute which provided that claim accrued when discovered by "patient or plaintiff.").
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to a minor who is without parent or legal guardian does not defeat the analysis
suggested herein. Specifically, subsection (3) provides, "[i]f at the time at which
a cause of action shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known
or discovered, the person to whom such claim accrued shall be a minor without
a parent or guardian." Certainly, this language in subsection (3) appears to assume that a claim of a minor who is without guardian may be discovered. If
there is no parent or legal guardian, discovery of the claim must be made by
someone, presumably the infant himself. If the statute contemplates discovery
of the claim by the infant, then the analysis suggested herein, that the claim
must be discovered by the parent or guardian, appears to conflict with this particular language in subsection (3).
The conflict between my analysis and this language in subsection (3) is,
however, more apparent than real. The thrust of my analysis is that a claim
should accrue when discovered by a parent or legal guardian, or when a reasonable parent or legal guardian would discover the claim. As such, whether or
not a minor has a parent or legal guardian, a claim could accrue to such a minor.
This is the very circumstance actually contemplated by subsection (3). A claim
accrues to a minor without parent or guardian not because it is discovered by
the minor but because a reasonable parent or guardian (a reasonable adult person) would have discovered the claim. In this circumstance, subsection (3) will
completely protect the minor's claim by tolling the statute of limitations until
a parent or legal guardian is appointed.
In short, the statute should be interpreted to provide that a claim accrues when
a parent or guardian discovers or should discover the existence of the claim.
When the tolling provisions speak of reasonable diligence, the standard of
reasonableness should be the diligence required of the reasonable adult, and
not that required of a minor. Of course, under this interpretation, the claim
of a minor can become barred by limitations because a parent or legal guardian
failed to act on the claim in a timely fashion, even though the minor had neither
ability to discover the claim nor capacity to sue. 90 Such a result, which is tolerated in this state in the context of wrongful death claims, 91 is the only result
90. McNeal v. Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971), overruled on other grounds, Burns v.
Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1988) (unemancipated child prohibited from suing parent); Durham v. Durham,
227 Miss. 76, 85 So. 2d 807 (1956).
91. Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So. 2d 491 (Miss. 1983). Note should be taken that the analysis for accrual of claims under § 15-1-36 is analogous to the manner in which the supreme court has dealt
with accrual of claims in the context of wrongful death actions. However, while I suggest that the accrual
provisions of § 15-1-36 be interpreted to provide that claims accrue when a parent or legal guardian would
discover the same with reasonable diligence, no reliance on the supreme court's treatment of accrual of claims
under the wrongful death statute is appropriate.
The court held in Arender that when a claim for wrongful death arising under Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13
(Supp. 1982), amended by § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1989), accrues as to one adult beneficiary it accrues as to all
other beneficiaries, including infant beneficiaries. That conclusion was compelled by two facts unique to
wrongful death cases. First, as the court noted, there is no savings provision for infants in wrongful death
cases. Id. at 493. Second, the court noted the wrongful death statute specifically provides that there is but
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which will harmonize the accrual provision and the amended tolling provisions
of section 15-1-36. 92
E. Is It Constitutional to Treat Malpractice Plaintiffs and Defendants
Differently than Other Tort Plaintiffs and Defendants?
By design, section 15-1-36 treats patients injured by enumerated health care
providers differently than other tort plaintiffs and correspondingly treats health
care providers who injure patients differently than other tortfeasors. Section
15-1-36 has a two-year period of limitations, rather than the three-year period
of limitations applicable to all other claims in tort. Also, section 15-1-36 has
a shorter tolling period for claims of minors against health care providers than
the tolling period applicable to all other tort actions. Provisions in section 15-1-36
prior to its amendment tolled the statute of limitations only until a minor reached
age sixteen, while the general tolling statute operated until the minor reached
majority.
The amendment to section 15-1-36 added a tolling provision which gives malpractice plaintiffs protection already given to other tort plaintiffs under the general
tolling provisions. The added provision tolls the period of limitations for minors
who are without parent or guardian at the time the claim accrues, which tolling
is already required by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-57 for all other
claims. However, with the amendment of the tolling provisions in section
15-1-36, the legislature established greater differences between the tolling provisions for malpractice claims and general tolling provisions. Tolling provisions for the disability of age (which reduce the age at which tolling ceases
from sixteen to six) give malpractice plaintiffs less protection than that afforded other tort claimants who still have tolling protection until they reach majority.
Finally, section 15-1-36 controls wrongful death claims arising from health
care malpractice. Under the catch-all statute of limitations which controls all
other wrongful death claims, a wrongful death action not based on health care
malpractice must be commenced within three years following death. Under section 15-1-36, however, wrongful death claims arising from health care malpractice must be commenced within two years. However, again because of its
tolling provisions, section 15-1-36 gives wrongful death claimants more and
less protection than other wrongful death claimants whose claims do not arise
from health care malpractice. The general tolling provisions of section 15-1-59
one claim for wrongful death. Id. Of course, neither of these features of wrongful death claims is applicable
to malpractice claims. The holding in Arender that when a claim accrues to an adult beneficiary it accrues
to all beneficiaries was compelled by the language of the wrongful death statute and the absence of an applicable tolling provision for minors. The interpretation of § 15-1-36 to provide that an infant's claim accrues when a parent or guardian does or should discover a claim is compelled by the particular language
of the tolling provisions which were amended or added to the statute.
92. Also, as is noted infra in text accompanying notes 159-60, an assumption underlying the amended
tolling provisions is that minors of age six are capable of communicating the fact of injuries to adults and
that adults will be responsible in taking action on these complaints. Therefore, a premise of the amended
tolling provisions is that minors may, but probably will not, suffer from the inaction of their parents.
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are inapplicable to wrongful death claims. 93 A claimant has three years to commence a wrongful death action regardless of age. However, for claims arising
from health care malpractice, a claimant has two years to commence a wrongful death action, unless that claimant is under the disability of age or unsoundness of mind or is without parent or guardian as defined in section 15-1-36.
In short, section 15-1-36 provides malpractice plaintiffs two years to file a
claim, while other tort plaintiffs have three years. The limitations period of
section 15-1-36 is tolled only until a claimant is age six, while the general-tolling provision tolls limitations periods until the minor reaches majority. Finally, the tolling provisions of section 15-1-36 protect wrongful death claimants
for claims arising from health care malpractice. There are no tolling provisions
applicable to other wrongful death claims.
As noted, differences in the treatment given malpractice plaintiffs as compared to other tort plaintiffs have existed since the malpractice statute of limitations was passed in 1976. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has had
several opportunities to interpret the malpractice statute, 11 to date it has not
passed on the constitutionality of the special statute of limitations for malpractice actions. 95 Proliferation of special malpractice statutes nationally has been
followed by a series of constitutional challenges to these statutes in various states,
and a constitutional challenge to amended section 15-1-36 may be expected. 96 However, in light of existing Mississippi precedent and in light of the
fact that a clear majority of jurisidictions has upheld special malpractice statutes of limitations, it is doubtful that constitutional challenges to section 15-1-36
will be successful.
F. Constitutional Challenges Under The United States Constitution
Although a couple of state courts have struck down malpractice statutes of
limitations under provisions of the United States Constitution, 97 federal courts
have unanimously held that malpractice statutes of limitations do not infringe
on any federal constitutional right. 91 However, even though federal law has
93. Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So. 2d 491 (Miss. 1983).
94. Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1988); Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042 (Miss. 1987);
Smith v. Sanders, 485 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 1986); Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984); Tribou
v. Gunn, 410 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982).
95. Tribou v. Gunn, 410 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982) (constitutionality of § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1981), amended
by § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989)(challenged, but not passed upon by the supreme court)).
96. See generally Andrews, supra note 8; Redish, supra note 8; Turkington, supra note 8; Comment,
The Right of Access, supra note 8; Comment, Federalism Reigns, supra note 7; Note, Judicial Conscience
versus Legislative Will, supra note 7; Note, Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose, supra note 7.
97. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,424 A.2d 825 (1980)(statute of repose requiring infants
under age eight to commence action by tenth birthday and providing a discovery provision for claims based
on foreign objects left in body violates equal protection guarantees of fourteenth amendment). See also Boucher
v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983)(system for processing malpractice claims violates federal constitutional
provisions for equal protection).
98. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984)(Kansas' four-year statute of repose which
bars claim before it is known does not violate equal protection); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.
1983)(lowa's six-year statute of repose for medical malpractice does not violate equal protection or due process);
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not been successfully used to strike down malpractice statutes of limitations,
standards of judicial scrutiny established by federal courts in cases dealing with
equal protection have been expropriated by state courts when considering equal
protection challenges to malpractice statutes. 99 Therefore, I will briefly review
federal precedent before discussing challenges to malpractice under state constitutions.
Equal protection challenges in federal court have been common, and consistently unsuccessful. 100 Three standards of review are utilized by federal courts
in evaluating statutes subjected to equal protection challenges. The most demanding of these standards is strict scrutiny, which is used by federal courts in evaluating statutes involving some suspect classification, such as one based on race
or involving infringement of some fundamental right. 101 Using strict scrutiny,
the court will sustain a discriminatory statute only if there is a compelling state
interest to be served and the regulation is necessary to protect that interest. 102 The
standard has been described as strict in theory and fatal in fact. 103 Statutes involving suspect classifications or infringing on fundamental rights generally do
not survive strict scrutiny.
An intermediate level of scrutiny, sometimes referred to as means scrutiny
analysis, has been employed by federal courts in cases which involve statutory
classifications which are not suspect, such as those based on gender or illegitimacy, but which merit special judicial scrutiny. 104 If the court finds the state's
interest to be important and the means adopted to serve that interest to be reasonable and not arbitrary and as having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation so that all persons in similar situations shall be treated alike,
legislation will be sustained under intermediate scrutiny.
The minimum scrutiny given by federal courts evaluating statutes under equal
Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982)(Minnesota two-year statute of repose, which starts
to run after termination of treatment, does not violate equal protection); Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405
(1st Cir. 1970)(Maine's statute of repose violates neither equal protection nor due process); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me. 1985)(Maine's two-year statute of limitation, unlike residual tort limitations statute of six years, does not violate equal protection); Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah
1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986)(statute of limitations requiring action to be commenced within
two years of discovery, but with provisions of repose requiring that action be brought no later than four
years from alleged act or omission, does not violate state or federal rights of due process); see also Barwick
v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984)(North Carolina's ten-year statute of repose violates no federal constitutional provisions).
99. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 68, 688 P.2d 961 (1984); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424
A.2d 825 (1980).
100. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.
1983); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405 (lst Cir.
1970); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me. 1985); Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D.
Utah 1984), revd, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir. 1984).
101. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See generally Redish, supra note 8, at 770.
102. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737, 739 (Miss. 1977).
103. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-ForwardIn Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
104. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737, 739 (Miss. 1977).

19891

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

protection challenges is rational basis scrutiny.

105

Under this standard of review,

a statute is constitutionally infirm "only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." " Using rational
basis scrutiny, "courts accept the legislative determination of relevancy so long
as it is reasonable, even though it may be debatable, debated, or opposed by
strong contrary arguments." 107
Federal courts have utilized only minimum scrutiny under the rational basis
test when considering constitutional challenges to malpractice statutes of limitations. 108 Federal courts have found that malpractice limitations statutes do
not infringe upon any fundamental rights because rights to sue in tort are not
of constitutional status. Likewise, federal courts have agreed that distinguishing malpractice plaintiffs or defendants from other tort plaintiffs or defendants
does not involve creation of a suspect classification. 109 Federal courts concede
that states have an interest in preventing litigation of stale claims, 110 in general, and have an interest in redressing any malpractice insurance crisis which
the legislature could perceive. 111 Establishing periods of limitations for malpractice actions has been held to be rationally related to both general and specific
legislative purposes. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in Brubaker v. Cavanaugh112 is indicative of the non-interventionist posture
of federal courts in this area. In that case Kansas' four-year statute of repose
which barred a claim before it was discovered was held not to violate equal
protection because a rational relationship existed between the regulation and
the state's interest in barring stale claims.
Longstanding federal precedent established in Vance v. Vance1 1 3 provides
that an infant has no constitutional right to have a statute of limitations tolled
during minority. Therefore, exclusion of minors in a malpractice statute of limi105. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See generally Redish, supra
note 8, at 770.
106. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737, 738 (Miss.
1977).
107. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 68, 688 P.2d 961, 970 (1984).
108. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.
1983); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405 (1st Cir.
1970); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me. 1985); Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D.
Utah 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir. 1984)(North Carolina's ten-year statute of repose violates no iederal constitutional provisions).
109. See supra note 108.
110. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982)(Minnesota's two-year statute of limitation,
which starts to run after termination of treatment, rationally related to state's interest in barring stale claims);
Owens v. white, 380 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1967)(the purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent fraudulent
and stale actions from arising after lapse of time while preserving for a reasonable period the right to pursue
a claim).
111. See, e.g., Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983)(lowa's six-year statute of repose for medical
malpractice does not violate equal protection or due process); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me.
1985)(Maine's two-year statute of limitation, unlike residual tort limitations statute of six years, does not
violate equal protection).
112. 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984).
113. 108 U.S. 514 (1882). See also Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1965)(rejecting
plaintiffs due process and equal protection challenge to Federal Torts Claims Act which does not toll limitation period during infancy).
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tations from general tolling provisions applicable to other tort claimants also
has passed constitutional scrutiny in federal court. For example, in Hargett v.
Limberg 114 a district court sustained Utah's four-year statute of repose which
was equally applicable to minors and adults. Apparently unaware of contrary
state precedent, 115 the court stated that "[i]t is universally accepted that a legislature may put adults and infants on the same footing with respect to statutes
of limitations without affecting constitutional rights." 116 Using rational basis
scrutiny, the court held that containment of the perceived malpractice crisis was
a legitimate government purpose. Illustrating the deference shown to legislatures under minimum scrutiny, the court noted that "constitutionality of the
measure does not depend on a court's assessment of its empirical success or
failure. It is sufficient if the legislature 'could rationallyhave decided'that the
means chosen will promote the legislative objectives." 117
G. Challenges under State Constitutions

Since the contraction of individual rights by the United States Supreme Court,
state constitutions have been rediscovered as an independent source of individual
rights. 118 Of course, state constitutions cannot give malpractice plaintiffs less
protection than that assured by federal constitutional law, but state constitutions may give state citizens more protection than that afforded them under federal
law. Constitutional challenges to tort reform measures based on state constitutional law are generally immune from federal review under the doctrine of adequate state grounds. 119
Statutes of limitations which treat health care malpractice plaintiffs differently from other tort plaintiffs have been challenged on several theories based
on state constitutional law. Various plaintiffs have alleged that these statutes
deny equal protection 120 or the right to due process or due course of law; 121 or
114. 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986).
115. See, e.g., Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
116. Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 156.
117. Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 158.
118. Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 15 (Mo. 1986)(Welliver, J., dissenting); Turkington,
supra note 8, at 1321; Andrews, supra note 8, at 473.
119. Turkington, supra note 8, at 1322-23.
120. Equal protection challenges were rejected in the following cases: Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d
318 (10th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Kansas law); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983)(interpreting
Iowa law); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Minnesota law); Clark v.
Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1970) (interpreting Maine law); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D.
Me. 1985); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho
179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.W.2d 891 (1980); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa
1986); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496
So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (1981); Hohn v. Slate, 48 N.C.
App. 624, 269 S.E.2d 307 (1980); Jones v. Salem Hosp., 93 Or. App. 252, 762 P.2d 303 (1988); Petri
v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453 A.2d 342 (1982); Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987);
Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d
30 (Utah 1981).
121. Constitutional challenges based on due process or due course of law provisions were rejected in the
following cases: Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022 (D.
Me. 1985); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657
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violate open court, 122 access to courts, 123 or right to remedy 124 provisions
of state constitutions; or constitute constitutionally prohibited special legislation. 125 A majority of courts which have considered special statutes of limitations for malpractice claims have held these provisions are constitutional under
both federal and applicable state law. 126 This majority of courts outnumbers

P.2d 476 (1983); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983);
Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982);
Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (1981); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453 A.2d
342 (1982).
122. Constitutional challenges based on open court provisions were rejected in the following cases: Dunn
v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 401 A.2d 77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La.
1986); Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822
(Tenn. 1978).
123. The following courts rejected constitutional challenges based on access to court provisions: Carr
v. Broward County, 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891
(1980); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980; Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md.
689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985). In Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986)(en banc), a malpractice
statute was declared unconstitutional as violative of Missouri's open court provision.
124. Constitutional challenges based on right to remedy provisions were rejected in Colton v. Dewey,
212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982) and Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978). Statutes
were declared unconstitutional in the following cases: Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d
626 (1987)(as violative of a right to remedy); Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d
80, 410 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)(as violative of "certain remedy" provision); Barrio v. San Manuel
Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101,692 P.2d 280 (1984)(as violative of the provision barring "abrogation" of remedies).
125. In the following cases malpractice statutes of limitations and/or repose were challenged as unconstitutional special legislation and found to be constitutional: Anderson v. Wagner, 79 111.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d
560 (1979); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1986); Stephens v. Snyder
Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30
(Utah 1981). In Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held a special
malpractice statute of repose constituted unconstitutional special legislation.
126. The following courts rejected constitutional challenges to special statutes of limitations: Brubaker
v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Kansas law); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th
Cir. 1983)(interpreting Iowa law); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982)(interpreting Minnesota law); Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1970)(interpreting Maine law); Houk v. Furman,
613 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Me. 1985); Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984, revd, 801 F.2d
368 (1986); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981); Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425
So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1983); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Steketee v. Lintz, 38
Cal. 3d 46, 694 P.2d 1153, 210 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1985); Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 401 A.2d 77 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1979); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Il1.
2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381
(Iowa 1986); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic
Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d (1981); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); Hill v. Fitzgerald,
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985); Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982); Armijo v.
Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (1981); Hohn v. Slate, 48 N.C. App. 624, 269 S.E.2d 307 (1980);
Jones v. Salem Hosp., 93 Or. App. 252, 762 P.2d 303 (1988); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453
A.2d 342 (1982); Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d
822 (Tenn. 1978); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981).
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by two to one courts finding these statutes unconstitutional. 127 However, judicial intervention oy state courts using state constitutional law to impede legislative initiatives on statutes of limitations represents a significant challenge to
such reforms. This intervention may provide plaintiffs disadvantaged by the
reforms with a substantial source of protection.
Section 15-1-36 probably will be challenged because of the distinctive treatment it gives various classes of plaintiffs. First, the statute, with a limitations
period one year shorter than that applicable to other tort plaintiffs who are subject to the three-year limitations period of section 15-1-49, treats malpractice
plaintiffs as a group differently than other victims of negligence. Second, the
tolling provisions of section 15-1-36 treat malpractice plaintiffs who are minors
differently than other tort plaintiffs who are minors. Third, section 15-1-36
treats wrongful death claimants with claims based on malpractice differently
than claimants under the general wrongful death statute. Each of these challenges
has been made in other states, and each challenge will be considered separately
below.
H. Constitutionality of Statutes Which Treat Malpractice Plaintiffs, as a
Class, Differently Than Other Plaintiffs Injured by Negligent Tortfeasors
Successful challenges to statutes which establish periods of limitations for
malpractice claims different from those applicable to other tort claims have involved statutes of repose, which, of course, are unlike section 15-1-36. 128 In
all these cases, the special statute for malpractice claims denied plaintiffs the
benefit, given to other tort claimants, of the discovery rule for accrual. For
instance, finding that the right to bring a malpractice action was a fundamental
right under the Arizona Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court in Kenyon
127. The following state courts found special statutes of limitations unconstitutional. Barrio v. San Manuel
Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101, 692 P.2d 280 (1984); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984);
Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Shessel
v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp.,
6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 503 N.E.2d
717 (1986); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland,
Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988); Sax v.
Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985); Kohnke v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 410 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
128. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984)(three-year statute of repose); Austin v.
Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984) (three-year statute of repose); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d
484 (1983) (two-year statute of repose); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984) (two-year
statute of repose); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (two-year statute of
repose); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (two-year statute of repose); Schwan v.
Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N. E.2d 1337 (1983) (four-year statute of repose); Mominee
v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986) (four-year statute of repose); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32"Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54,
514 N.E.2d 709 (1987) (four-year statute of repose); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988) (threeyear statute of repose); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (two-year statute of repose); Neagle
v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (two-year statute of repose); Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 410 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (five-year statute of repose).
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v. Hammer 129 struck down Arizona's three-year statute of repose for malpractice claims which eliminated all tolling provisions applicable to other
claims. Evaluating the statute of repose under strict scrutiny, the court assumed
the state's interest in decreasing medical costs or increasing availability of medical
services. However, the court held that the statute was a violation of equal protection because elimination of the discovery rule and of general tolling provisions was not necessary to achieve the state's compelling interest. 130
Numerous other courts, however, have upheld special malpractice statutes
of repose even though they could bar a claim before its discovery. 131 Utilizing
only minimum scrutiny when evaluating these statutes of repose, courts have
recognized that the establishment of periods within which malpractice claims
must be filed is rationally related to the goal of reducing malpractice costs and
increasing health care availability or, more generally, to eliminating the litigation of stale claims.
L Treating Wrongful Death Claims Based on Malpractice Differently
Two courts have addressed directly the constitutionality of statutes which treat
wrongful death claims arising from health care malpractice differently than other
wrongful death claims. Both decisions involved statutes of repose, which, unlike section 15-1-36, required that a wrongful death claim be brought within
two years from the negligent act or omission. Such statutes create the possibility that a wrongful death claim could be barred before the patient dies. Noting
that possibility, the Georgia Supreme Court in Clark v. Singer, '32 using intermediate scrutiny, held Georgia's two-year statute of repose for malpractice unconstitutional under Georgia's equal protection clause. On the other hand, the
New Mexico Supreme Court in Armijo v. Tandysh, 133 even after recognizing
129. 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984).
130. Id. at 979.
131. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Kansas's four-year statute of
repose); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Iowa's six-year statute of repose); Clark
v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1970)(interpreting Maine law); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. Hosp., 403
So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (four-year statute of repose); Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1983)
(four-year statute of repose); Steketee v. Lintz, 38 Cal. 3d 46, 694 P.2d 1153, 210 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1985)
(three-year statute of repose); Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 401 A.2d 77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (threeyear statute of repose); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983) (two-year statute of repose);
Anderson v. Wagner, 79 111.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (four-year statute of repose); Rohrabaugh v.
Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661,413 N.E.2d 891 (1980) (two-year statute of repose); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (two-year statute of repose); Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d
381 (Iowa 1986) (six-year statute of repose); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983);
Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981) (four-year statute of repose); Crier
v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986) (three-year statute of repose); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689,
501 A.2d 27 (1985) (five-year statute of repose); Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982)
(ten-year statute of repose); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (1981) (three-year statute
of repose); Jones v. Salem Hosp., 93 Or. App. 252, 762 P.2d 303 (1988) (five-year statute of repose); Smith
v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987) (six-year statute of repose); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d
822 (Tenn. 1978) (three-year statute of repose).
132. 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983).
133. 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (1981).
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that New Mexico's three-year statute of repose could bar wrongful claims before death, found the statute violated neither due process nor equal protection.
J. Differential Treatment for Minors
Statutes of limitations such as section 15-1-36 treat minors beyond a specified age who are injured by health care malpractice as adults and unlike minors
injured by other negligent tortfeasors. 134 This treatment has been challenged
on the grounds that limiting minors' rights to bring malpractice claims infringes
on a fundamental right and that treating minors injured by malpractice as adults,
and unlike minors injured by other tortfeasors, involves the creation of a suspect classification. Courts which reject the notion that these statutes of limitations involve infringements of fundamental rights, or involve the creation of
a suspect class, have generally given the statutes minimum judicial scrutiny and
upheld their constitutionality on the grounds that a rational relationship exists
between the restrictions of the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose. 135 On the other hand, courts which have found that the statutes infringe
on fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications have generally given
these statutes strict scrutiny and struck them down after finding no compelling
state interest sufficient to justify such infringement or classification. 136
The leading case upholding a statute of limitations similar to amended section 15-1-36 is Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner 137 in which the Supreme Court of Indiana considered a statute providing that no claim in tort or contract arising
from professional services could be brought against a health care provider "unless filed within two years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect
except that a minor under the full age of six years shall have until his eighth
birthday in which to file." 13
The plaintiff challenged the statute on the basis that it infringed upon a fundamental right to file suit or seek redress in courts, which the plaintiff claimed
134. All minors are treated like adults under statutes of repose. However, § 15-1-36, which is not a statute of repose because of its special infant tolling provisions, treats minors like adults only after those minors
reach age six.
135. Special infant tolling provisions similar to Mjss.CoDE ANN. § 15-1-36 (1972) were found constitutional in the following cases: Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (period of
limitation of two years from time of injury or six months from discovery, with tolling provision for infants
under age four); Steketee v. Lintz, 38 Cal. 3d 46, 694 P.2d 1153, 210 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1985) (infant tolling
provisions for minors under age six); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 I11.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Rohrabaugh
v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980) (two-year statute of repose with tolling provision for
infants under age six); Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1986); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 Kan. App.
2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983) (infants given eight years from occurrence of act to commence action); Petri
v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453 A.2d 342 (1982).
136. Special infant tolling provisions were held to be unconstitutional in the following cases: Barrio v.
San Manuel Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101, 692 P.2d 280 (1984); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d
7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist
Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
137. 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980).
138. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (1975). The section applies to all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability. A subsequent provision of the Indiana Code, § 16-9.5-3-2, provides a savings clause in case
of legal disability where the disability arises from the professional services or health care rendered.
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was guaranteed by a provision of the Indiana Constitution ensuring a right to
remedy by due course of law. This claim, which was essentially a due process
challenge, was rejected by the court on the grounds that in imposing a period
of limitations on the right to file actions the legislature did not infringe on a
fundamental right.
Secondly, the statute was challenged on the grounds that it violated the equal
protection guarantees of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Although
conceding that the statute treated children between the ages of six and twentyone who have tort or contract claims against health care providers differently
than other tort or contract plaintiffs, the court concluded that for the purposes
of equal protection analysis a classification of "children between the ages of
six and twenty-one, is not suspect." 1 3 Finding no suspect classification and
no infringement of a fundamental right, the court used minimum rather than
strict scrutiny in evaluating the statute. Under a rationality standard, the court
found the statute to be a legislative response reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental end, to wit, promoting the availability of health care services to
the public, which was being reduced by actual or threatened loss to the health
care industry of reasonably priced malpractice insurance. 140
The leading case striking down a statute of limitations on constitutional grounds
is the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Sax v. Votteler, 141 which involved
a constitutional challenge to a statute of limitations for malpractice claims which,
like section 15-1-36 of the Mississippi Code, required claims of minors under
age six to be brought within two years after the minor's sixth birthday. Under
Texas law the limitations period for tort claims of minors, other than malpractice claims, was tolled until the minor reached majority.
The statute was challenged under the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, which requires that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for
an injury done him . . . shall have remedy by due course of law." 14 2 In its
due process analysis of the statute, the court used a balancing test to determine
whether the means used by the legislature to achieve its purpose unreasonably
restricted a common right of action of the individual minors. The court noted
that under Texas law a minor could not bring a claim in her own right, and,
if the minor's parent negligently failed to bring a claim on behalf of the minor,
139. Rohrabaugh, 274 Ind. at 666, 413 N.E.2d at 894.
140. The court wrote:
The Legislature through . . . [the malpractice limitation statute] withdrew its disability protection
from children between the ages of six and twenty-one, and required that they be subjected to the
same time limitation in bringing malpractice actions against health care providers as persons over
twenty-one. To grant disability during minority to a six year old child is to subject health care providers
who have treated him to malpractice actions seventeen years after treatment is completed. That exposure can result in unfairness to the defending health care provider stemming from the passage of
time. The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that the reduction of this potential for unfairness would help to alleviate those conditions which had resulted in the reduction of health care services.
Id. at 667, 413 N.E.2d at 894-95.
141. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
142. TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. 1, § 13.
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the minor was barred of any remedy against the parent under the doctrine of
parent-child immunity. Further, unlike other jurisdictions, the Texas court refused to agree that it is reasonable to expect parents adequately to protect the
interests of their children. The court wrote that "[i]t is neither reasonable nor
realistic to rely on parents, who may themselves be minors, or who may be
ignorant, lethargic, or lack concern, to bring a malpractice lawsuit action within the time provided by [the statute]." 143 Although conceding the existence
of the valid legislative purpose of reducing insurance costs to the health care
industry by reducing the period of exposure, the court in Sax found that the
means used by the legislature were unreasonable "when they are weighed against
the effective abrogation of a child's right to redress." Balancing the competing
interests, the court did not indicate why important rights of individual minors
outweigh the important societal interests in the statute.
Although both the Indiana and Texas Constitutions contain open court provisions assuring plaintiffs remedies by due course of law, these two courts reached
different conclusions regarding the constitutional import of such provisions when
considering challenges to the respective statutes of limitations. Both courts interpreted the open courts provisions as creating a right to bring claims before
state courts. However, in Rohrabraugh, the Indiana court found that the existence of that right did not imply that plaintiffs are entitled to any specific period of limitations and that the right could be regulated by provisions setting time
limits for action. The court in Sax, on the other hand, held that the open court
provision, as a source of a fundamental constitutional right, either could not
be qualified or could be qualified only by narrowly drawn regulations supported by compelling state interests.
Consistent with Rohrabaugh, all state court decisions upholding the constitutionality of special infant tolling provisions for malpractice claims employ minimum scrutiny in reviewing these statutes. 144 However, two courts, purporting
to employ minimum scrutiny, have held that special infant tolling provisions
violate the equal protection provisions of either state or federal constitutions.
143. 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983).
144. Several states have upheld statutes of limitations similar to Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (1972) which
treat minors who are victims of health care malpractice differently than minors who are injured by other
tortfeasors. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152
(D. Utah 1984), revd, 801 F.2d 368 (1986); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem. Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981);
Wheeler v. Lenski, 8 Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983)(upholding statute which limits to eight-year
period in which malpractice claims may be brought by minors and incapacitated persons and which thereby
treats these persons differently than persons injured by other tortfeasors); Jones v. Salem Hosp., 93 Or.
App. 252, 762 P.2d 303 (1988) (statute providing shorter limitations period for malpractice claims of minors
and incapacitated persons has rational basis to support it and so does not violate equal protection); Petri
v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453 A.2d 342, 348 (1982) ("'settled rule' in Pennsylvania is that it is not
violative of any constitutional rights to hold minors bound equally with adults to the prescribed statutory
periods within which legal causes of action may be brought"); McCarroll v. Doctors Gen. Hosp., 664 P.2d
382 (Okla. 1983); Kite v. Campbell, 142 Cal. App. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1983) (statute limiting
to three years period in which malpractice claims for minors may be brought does not deny equal protection
to those minors even though minors injured by other tortfeasors do not have to bring claims until after reaching majority). Each of these courts used rational basis scrutiny in assessing the challenged statutes, after
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Both courts found that statutes treating minors with health care malpractice claims
differently from minors with other tort claims neither infringed upon a fundamental right nor created a suspect classification. 1,5 The Ohio Supreme Court,
in Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hospital, '1 held that a statute requiring a
minor under age ten when injured by health care malpractice to commence actions prior to his fourteenth birthday created an irrational distinction between
those younger than age ten and those who are ten years of age or older. Although
conceding the legislative prerogative to draw lines to achieve its ends, the court
found that "it is the age of majority which establishes the only rationaldistinction." 147 The effect of the court's opinion in Schwan was to treat all minors
with malpractice claims as adults, subject to a single limitations period. The
Ohio court subsequently held this treatment of minors violated the minors' rights
to due process and therefore judicially imposed a tolling provision for claims

of minors. 148
Before considering the constitutionality of section 15-1-36 of the Mississippi
Code, some observations should be made regarding decisions involving constitutional challenges to similar statutes of limitations. First, most courts have
found special statutes of limitations for malpractice claims constitutional; and
a majority of courts which have considered special infant tolling provisions have
held that those provisions are constitutional even when they are applicable only
to health care malpractice claims. 149
Second, although the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Carson v.
Maurer150 suggested that such statutes may violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, most courts agree that under rational basis scrurejecting contentions that the statutes either infringed on fundamental rights or involved suspect classifications. In addition, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Hohn v. Slate, 48 N.C. App. 624, 269 S.E.2d
307 (1980), upheld a malpractice statute which provided a shorter statute of limitations for minors with malpractice claims than that provided for minors injured by other tertfeasors. The malpractice statute, however,
was dissimiliar to Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (1972) insofar as it did not require claims of minors to be
brought prior to reaching majority.
145. 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1339.
148. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986). The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, in Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980), struck down its health care malpractice statute of limitation which provided for differential treatment of minors on the grounds that such treatment violated the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution. Federal courts have disagreed
with the equal protection analysis employed in Carson. One federal court has noted that the court in Carson
was not utilizing rational basis scrutiny in its equal protection analysis. Houk v. Furman, 613 F.2d 1022
(1985). Courts in other states have declared unccnstitutional statutes of limitations which treat minors with
malpractice claims differently than minors with other tort claims. The Missouri Supreme Court, following
the reasoning in Sax, held that the statute of limitations for health care claims as applied to minors violated
the right of access to courts provisions of the Missouri Constitution. Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d
7 (Mo. 1986)(en banc). The Arizona Supreme Court struck down a statute of limitations which provided
that claims of minors under age seven must be brought within three years after reaching age seven on the
grounds that the statute violated a provision of the Arizona Constitution prohibiting abrogation of a "right
of action to recover damages for injury." Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101, 692 P.2d 280 (1981).
149. See supra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
150. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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tiny these statutes of limitations pass muster under the federal Constitution. Therefore, as in Sax v. Votteler, successful challenges of these statutes probably can
only be made under state constitutional provisions. If section 15-1-36 is to be
challenged, it will be challenged under Mississippi's state constitution. Although,
as noted, a clear majority of decisions have sustained the constitutionality of
special malpractice statutes of limitations, one scholar, despairing of judicial
activism by state courts in striking down tort reform measures of state constitutions, has urged that federal legislation is necessary in these areas to insulate
these initiatives from constitutional challenge. 151
Third, courts generally concede that promoting the availability of health care
services and reducing health care insurance costs are goals, and appropriate
ones, of the special statute of limitations for health care actions. This is conceded even by courts which have struck down special malpractice statutes.
Fourth, in evaluating equal protection or due process challenges, a clear majority of courts, including most of those striking down these statutes on constitutional grounds, have held that statutes of limitations similar to section 15-1-36
do not infringe on fundamental rights or create suspect classifications. Therefore, a majority of courts purport to give these statutes only minimum or rational basis scrutiny and suggest that the statute should be sustained as long
it is reasonably related to remedying a problem which a rational legislature could
believe existed. Whether the goals of the statutes will actually be achieved by
limiting the time in which claims of minors may be brought is generally not
scrutinized by a majority of courts reviewing these statutes.
Fifth, courts which have struck down special malpractice statutes have usually
struck down statutes of repose, which eliminate the discovery rule for claims
and therefore create the possibility of barring a claim before its existence could
be discovered. Animosity toward statutes of repose is clearly articulated. Courts
which strike down these statutes find their operation simply unfair 15 2 and, therefore, either strike them down directly on the ground of unfairness or else find
that these statutes of repose cannot pass muster under the applicable standard
of review. 153 Of course, section 15-1-36 is not a statute of repose.
Related to this last point is the fact that courts which strike down special statutes of limitations generally identify empirical deficiencies in the legislation. '54 These state courts usually express suspicion or disbelief regarding the
151. Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38
L. REV. 195, 200 (1985).
152. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 937, 424 A.2d 825, 834 (1980)(statute of limitations "unfairly
burdens and discriminates against medical malpractice plaintiffs" and therefore denies plaintiffs equal protection).
153. The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 86, 688 P.2d 961, 978
(1984) is an example of the latter approach. There, using strict scrutiny, the court found that the record
was devoid of evidence "[which] would support the necessity of the legislative discrimination between malpractice claimants with undiscoverable injuries." Id.
154. Turkington, supra note 8, at 1329.
OKLA.
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existence of any malpractice insurance crisis. 155 Therefore, these courts doubt
that there is any real problem being solved by this legislation. Also, even when
these courts admit or assume that the legislature might have an interest in reducing
health care costs or increasing health care availability, these courts find that
legislatures are unable to redress these problems with statute of limitations reform. 156 The New Hampshire Supreme Court's opinion in Carson v. Maurer
is typical of this line of reasoning. There, the court noted that elimination of
tolling provisions for infants would not "substantially further the legislative object of containing the costs of the medical injury reparations system because
the number of malpractice claims brought by or on behalf of minors or mental
157
incompetents is comparatively small."
Finally, some specific comments should be made regarding the operation of
and the assumptions behind special infant tolling provisions. Whether or not
these statutes of limitations succeed in promoting the availability of health care
to the public and/or reducing health care insurance costs, statutes eliminating
infant tolling provisions do create the possibility that these goals may be achieved
at a cost of sacrificing the rights of injured minors to be compensated for valid
claims. 158 In order to reduce the number of older claims filed, valid claims
of minors which are not timely filed by parents or guardians will be barred.
This very real cost is incurred even in states, like Mississippi, where the minor
has no right to file the action in his own right while in the minority 159 and has
no recourse against his parent or guardian for not filing the action. 160 Provisions
eliminating or reducing tolling provisions will operate arbitrarily, like all limitations provisions, because these provisions may serve to bar both the valid
claim and the invalid claim.
Two assumptions are behind the legislative judgment that special infant tolling provisions like those in section 15-1-36 are reasonable. These assumptions
are: first, that a minor by age six is old enough to inform his or her parents
of the existence of an injury or ailment causing distress to him or her; 161 and
second, that parents or legal guardians may be relied upon to evaluate complaints and thereby discover claims where appropriate. 162 Courts agreeing with
the reasonableness of these assumptions will find the statutes employing them
155. The leading denouncement of the case for the existence of a malpractice crisis is the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's opinion in Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983), which did not involve a challenge
to a statute of limitations. There the court noted it was proper for the lower court to take judicial notice
that "no malpractice crisis existed in 1981." Id. at 93.
156. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. at 86, 688 P.2d at 978.
157. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 937, 424 A.2d at 834.
158. Andrews, supra note 8, at 486-87.
159. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n v. Moyo, 525 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1988); Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816, 826, 138 So. 593, 595 (1932)("Infants and persons of unsound mind are disabled
under the law to act for themselves.").
160. McNeal v. Estate of McNeil, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971)(unemancipated child prohibited from
suing parent); Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So. 2d 807 (1956).
161. Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986)(Welliver, J., dissenting).
162. Rohrabaugh, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891; Strahler, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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constitutional under a rational basis analysis. On the other hand, courts such
as the one in Sax, which disagree with the reasonableness of these assumptions,
will resort to state constitutional law to defeat these statutes of limitations.
K. Anticipated Challenges to Amended Section 15-1-36 in Mississippi
As has already been noted, section 15-1-36 is not a statute of repose. It is
a statute of limitations which contains a discovery provision which has been
liberally construed in favor of plaintiffs. Therefore, section 15-1-36 cannot operate to bar claims before those claims could have been discovered. However,
a claim under section 15-1-36 can become barred if the claim is not filed by
the responsible parent or guardian within the time period provided by the section. Under section 15-1-36 minors will be charged with the negligence of adults
who do not act upon their claims. It is this feature of the similar Texas statute
which the court in Sax v. Votteler found so troubling since that court believed
that relying on parents to commence claims is not reasonable.
In light of existing precedent interpreting pertinent provisions of the Mississippi Constitution, constitutional challenges to Mississippi Code section 15-1-36
probably will be unsuccessful. However, because animosity toward so-called
tort reform measures springs eternal, challenges to section 15-1-36 may be anticipated under the due process and open court provisions of the state constitution.
L. Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges
Section 14 of the Bill of Rights in the Mississippi Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process
of law." 163 The Mississippi Supreme Court has generally acknowledged that
the due process protection in section 14 is coextensive with that provided in
the due process clause contained in the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and has generally either evaluated due process claims under the federal provision or looked to well-established federal precedent when
interpreting the state due process clause. 164 As stated earlier, federal courts
have consistently held that a minor has no constitutional right to have a statute
of limitations tolled in her favor due to the disability of infancy. 165 Given reliance on federal precedent by Mississippi courts, due process challenges to section 15-1-36 will be unsuccessful in Mississippi. Section 15-1-36 is not a statute
of repose, and so attacks based on the unfairness of barring claims which have
not yet accrued cannot be made against this statute of limitations.
Mississippi's Constitution contains no equal protection clause, and the supreme
court has never read the due process clause of the state constitution to include
a right of equal protection. Even if the supreme court were to read the due process
163. MIss. CONST. art. InI, § 14.

164. See generally Munford & Wiggs, Commentary on the Bill of Rights in the Mississippi Constitution
of 1890 and Beyond, 56 Miss L.J. 73, 92 (1986).
165. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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clause to include a right of equal protection, given the majority view that statutes like section 15-1-36 neither create suspect classifications nor infringe on
fundamental rights, an equal protection challenge likely also will be unsuccessful under a rational basis analysis. The general purpose of all the statute of limitations amendments in H.B. 1171 is to reduce the number of older claims filed
in Mississippi. These amendments are designed to promote diligence by plaintiffs and security for defendants, while allowing Mississippi courts to focus
resources on more recent claims. More specifically, the amendments of section 15-1-36 are designed to reduce the number of older health care malpractice claims filed by persons whose claims could have been discovered earlier
by parents or guardians. Section 15-1-36, therefore, is designed to reduce longterm exposure of health care providers to claims. Presumably, creating security for health care providers increases (or prevents decreases in) the availability
of health care; and reducing long-term exposure may have the additional benefit
of reducing, or perhaps slowing, the escalation of health care costs.
Under minimum scrutiny, the Supreme Court of Mississippi will probably
find that section 15-1-36, even with the numerous distinctions it makes between
health care consumers and providers and other tort claimants and defendants,
is a rational means to achieve both the general and specific goals of the statute.
The empirical evidence is clear; reductions in periods of limitations reduce the
number of claims filed and the number of claims paid. 166 Therefore, if one
of the general goals of the statute is to reduce claims, reduction of tolling provisions is rationally related to achieving that end.
If the court looks to the more specific goals of the statute, increasing (or slowing
reductions of) health care services and perhaps reducing (or slowing the increase of) health care costs, the amended statute is likewise a mechanism which
is rationally related to achieving such goals. It is important to recognize that
a potential for health care curtailment exists even if there is no actual insurance
crisis or explosion of claims against health care providers. When dealing with
the present or future availability of health care services, whether the frequency
of malpractice claims against health care providers is actually rising is not important. Subjective beliefs of health care providers of the potential for increased
malpractice exposure have great impact because even if such beliefs are not
factually based it is upon such beliefs that health care providers will act when
determining whether or not to extend or limit the availability of their services.
Therefore, whether or not health care providers are facing an actual increase
in risk exposure, legislation which addresses the subjective beliefs of providers
that such exposure exists should serve to increase health care availability. 167 As
such, even if the court looks to the most specific goals of section 15-1-36, it
should recognize that this legislation has a rational relationship to the legislative purpose.
166. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
167. Id.
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M. Challenges Based on the Open Courts Provisions
Section 24, the open courts provision of the Mississippi Constitution, 168 is
the other probable source of constitutional challenges to section 15-1-36. Section 24 provides: "All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done
him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." 169 Presumably, challengers to section 15-1-36 will assert that the statute
violates the constitutional guarantee of a "remedy by due course of law." 170 The
supreme court, however, has not used section 24 to defeat legislative initiatives which restrict or alter existing common-law remedies. 171 The court traditionally has been deferential to the legislature when evaluating statutes under
the open courts provisions. 172
In Walters v. Blackledge, 173 for instance, the court refused to declare the
Workers' Compensation Act unconstitutional under section 24. More to the point
for the purposes of evaluating potential constitutional challenges to section
15-1-36, the court in Anderson v. Wagner 174 upheld a special statute of repose
for claims against architects and contractors. Citing Blackledge, the court wrote,
"there is no vested right in any remedy for torts yet to happen, and except as
to vested rights the state legislature has full power to change or abolish existing
common-law remedies and methods of procedure." 175 Essentially, the court
has consistently refused to interpret section 24 as barring regulation or alteration of common-law tort remedies. As long as rights under existing law have
not vested, the legislature retains its prerogative to establish periods of limitations for tort claims. 176 Therefore, absent a significant change in the court's
view of state constitutional law, challenges to section 15-1-36 as violative of
the open courts provisions will likely be unsuccessful. Other state courts have
upheld workers' compensation systems and statutes of repose for builders and
architects and still struck down on constitutional grounds special statutes of limitations for malpractice claims. Texas is an example of this anomalous approach. 177 Alabama, on the other hand, has struck down on constitutional
grounds a statute of repose for builders but upheld a statute of repose for mal168. Miss. CONST. art. III, § 24.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See generally Munford & Wiggs, supra note 163, at 101-04.
172. Id.
173. 220 Miss. 485, 71 So. 2d 433 (1954).
174. 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981).
175. Id. at 324 (citing Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. at 518, 71 So. 2d at 446).
176. Amended section 15-1-36 does not affect vested rights. Its effective date, which is discussed in the
next section, is July 1, 1989. Claims accruing prior to that date are controlled by the older provisions enacted in 1976.
177. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(malpractice statute of limitation unconstitutional); Sowders v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 663 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(construction statute of repose constitutional); see Note, Federalism Reigns, supra note 7, at 657-64 (listing statutes by state).
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practice claims. 178 Commentators have noted an emerging concept in state constitutional law, the concept of constitutional quid pro quo, which may help to
explain how state courts can sustain statutes of repose in one context, yet find
statutes of limitations for health care malpractice unconstitutional. 179 For instance, in the workers' compensation context, courts have upheld such compensation systems when challenged under state constitutional law on the grounds
that, while the claimant's rights in tort were abrogated, the claimant benefited
by the elimination of common-law defenses and the assurance of compensation
for work-related injuries. When evaluating tort reform measures, courts likewise look for a quid pro quo to determine what the plaintiff received in exchange for the abrogation of rights to bring claims against health care
providers. 180 Courts which find quid pro quo absent may strike down tort reform measures even though those same courts had previously upheld workers'
compensation schemes or special statutes of repose.
Putting aside whether the quidpro quo concept is or should be a part of Mississippi constitutional law, 181 amendments to section 15-1-36 and the other statutory changes clearly have a quid pro quo for plaintiffs. As has been noted, section
15-1-36 gives malpractice plaintiffs more and less protection than other tort
plaintiffs receive. Section 15-1-36 has a shorter tolling period for infants. Section 15-1-36 provides plaintiffs in wrongful death actions arising from malpractice
a period of only two years to commence an action. Other wrongful death claimants have three years to commence their actions. However, section 15-1-36
has tolling provisions applicable to wrongful death claims to which it applies,
while other wrongful death claimants have the benefit of no such provisions. 182
N. Effective Date of Amended Section 15-1-36
Subsection (12) of section 2 of H.B. 1171 provides that "[t]he limitation established by this section as to actions commenced on behalf of minors shall apply
only to actions the cause of which accrued on or after July 1,
1989." 183 Therefore, provisions shortening the period of tolling from sixteen
178. Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981)(malpractice statute of limitations
unconstitutional); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983)(construction statute
of repose constitutional).
179. Redish, supra note 8, at 785-90; Turkington, supra note 8, at 1332-34.
180. Id.
181. The concept suggests that for every reform where plaintiffs rights are curtailed the plaintiff must
receive some advantage in exchange. The problem with the concept is that it views reforms in isolation and
not as part of the broader development of compensation law over time. Plaintiffs have, over time, received
benefits at the expense of defendants. The judicial adoption of strict liability and the legislative adoption
of comparative negligence are two good examples. When those reforms were adopted, the defendant received
no quid pro quo. Recent reforms may be characterized as merely the quid pro quo for defendants for previous reforms which favored plaintiffs.
182. Conceivably Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989) can also be challenged as unconstitutional
special legislation under Miss. CoNsT. art. IV, § 87. However, in light of the supreme court's reluctance
in the past to strike down legislation on those grounds, it is unlikely that such a challenge will prove successful. See Comment, General, Special, Local and Private Legislation: A Mississippi Overview, 56 Miss. L.J.
327 (1986).
183. Amend. No. 1, H.B. 1171, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Miss. Laws 19.
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to six years and the provision tolling the statute for minors who are without
parent or guardian at the time their claims accrue became effective only as to
claims accruing after July 1, 1989. By postponing the effective date of the amended tolling provisions, the legislature avoided any potential constitutional problems.
Because the statute only affects claims not yet vested, it will not run afoul of
the open courts provision of the constitution. Had the legislature not included
an effective date which protected claims already vested, the Mississippi Supreme
Court certainly would have read one into the statute. Unlike other state
courts, 184 the Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held that it "may not
give retroactive effect to newly enacted statutes of limitations shortening the
185
period within which a claim arising prior to enactment must be brought."
Interestingly, the statute creates the possibility for an unusual role reversal
for plaintiffs and defendants arguing limitations issues under section 15-1-36.
Assume an infant is born on June 1, 1989, who, due to alleged negligence in
the delivery by the attending physician, suffers injury or impairment. If the claim
of the infant is discovered prior to July 1, 1989, the claim is governed by the
old provisions of section 15-1-36 and may be brought at any time priorto two
years after the infant's sixteenth birthday. Therefore, a claim brought nearly
eighteen years after the birth will be timely as long as the claim was discovered
before July 1, 1989. If, on the other hand, the claim is not discovered until
after July 1, 1989, the claim must be brought within two years after the infant's
sixth birthday, which means that claims brought more than eight years after
the infant's birth will be untimely. Assuming a claim is brought after the infant's ninth birthday, the plaintiff will have to argue that the claim was discovered earlier and the defendant will argue that it was not discovered until after
July 1. This, of course, reverses the usual positions taken in disputes over limitations periods where the defendants argue that the claim accrued earlier and
the plaintiff argues for later accrual. Because earlier accrual in this example
means a longer period of tolling, plaintiffs will argue in these cases that the
claim was discovered before the effective date of the new statute. 186
III.

AMENDMENT OF CATCH-ALL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Prior to its amendment by section 3 of H.B. 1171, section 15-1-49 provided:
"[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be com184. Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981).
185. Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45 (Miss. 1987).
186. Of course, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 85-92, the plaintiffs first position in such
cases may be that the discovery provisions of the new statute require that the minor discover the existence
of the claim. As noted earlier, that interpretation of the statute is unreasonable and generally would defeat
the purpose of the amendments. Assuming the interpretation of the discovery provisions offered in this article is correct, in the hypothetical case posed the plaintiff will have to take the position that the discovery
rule should be interpreted as requiring discovery by the parent, not the minor.
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menced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not
after." 187
Section 3 of H.B. 1171 altered this limitations period from six years to three
but left the remainder of the statute unchanged. The apparent purpose of the
amendment to the statute is to reduce the number of older claims being filed
in the state. Obviously, if Mississippi's experience with this shorter statute is
comparable to that observed in other states, the number of tort claims filed in
Mississippi will be reduced substantially. However, one loophole in the statute
may limit the effectiveness of the amended statute to achieve the goal of claims
reduction.
Section 15-1-49 is the catch-all statute of limitations which provides a limitations period for all actions for which no specific limitations provision is applicable. The six-year catch-all statute was added to the 1880 Code 188 and prior
to its amendment last year had not been amended since 1942. 189 This limitations provision controls all tort actions except those for intentional torts 190 and
claims for medical malpractice, which since 1976 have been governed by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36. 191 Contract actions, excepting those
actions falling under the limitations periods of the Commercial Code 19 2 and
actions on accounts and unwritten contracts 193 are likewise generally controlled
by this provision. Because of the many classes of actions which are controlled
by section 15-149, the Mississippi Supreme Court has had more opportunities
to interpret this statute than any other statute of limitations in the Code. 194
As a measure to reduce the number of older tort claims being filed in state
courts, the amendment of section 15-1-49 may not be able to achieve its purpose because of a loophole in its provisions. Most lawyers worthy of a client's
confidence and admission in the state bar should be able to avoid the three-year
limitations period in product liability cases by pleading an untimely claim in
tort as a breach of warranty. Since breach of warranty claims arising from the
sale of goods are governed by a five-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 75-2-725, an untimely product liability case could
easily sound in contract. Whether this circumvention by artful pleading of the
amended statute of limitations will be tolerated is an open question. Certainly,
if the legislature intended to reduce the limitations period for claims for breach
187. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972).
188. REV. CODE MISS. ch. 76, § 2669 (1880).
189. MIss. CODE ANN. § 722 (1942).
190. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1989) (which controls actions for "assault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, or menance, [sic] and all actions for slanderous words
concerning the person or title, for failure to employ, and for libels . . ").
191. MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 47-60.
192. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-725 (1972).
193. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-29, -31 (1972 & Supp. 1989).
194. For instance, because § 15-1-49 states that the limitations period runs "after the cause of such action
accrue[s]," the court has in several cases had to determine when an action accrues for the purposes of the
statute. See, e.g., In re McLeod, 506 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987); Estate of Kidd v. Kidd, 435 So. 2d 632
(Miss. 1983); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughey, 358 So. 2d 1307 (Miss. 1978).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:231

of warranty under section 75-2-725 of the Commercial Code, it could have done
so by express language. 195 Failure of the legislature to so provide when amending
section 15-1-49 suggests that it may not have intended to supplant the limitations period for breach of warranty actions under section 75-2-725. Also, recoverable damages in a contract action are more limited in scope than damages
recoverable in tort for claims based on personal injury. 196 Therefore, a plaintiff proceeding under the breach of warranty theory is limiting the scope of his
recoverable damages and so suffers the consequences of artful pleading. 197
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has not been solicitous
of sounding product liability claims in terms of breach of warranty actions. In
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 198 for instance, the court stated in dicta that
the breach of implied warranty theory in products liability cases should be "wholly
supplanted" 199 by strict product liability. However, several sections of Mississippi's Commercial Code support the proposition that implied warranty claims
have not been supplanted by the judicial adoption of strict product liability. Given
the court's position in Reeves, the court may be inclined to narrowly construe
claims of plaintiffs to make section 15-1-49 control product actions. That would
serve to reduce the number of older product claims, consistent with the apparent intent of the amendment, at the expense of fidelity to the purposes behind
the implied warranty provisions of the Commercial Code.
IV.

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 15-1-65:

CREATION OF A TRUE BORROWING STATUTE

A. Historical Background
Section 15-1-65, prior to its amendment in H.B. 1171, was a borrowing statute which seldom functioned as such. Originally passed in 1880, the statute
remained unchanged and consistently interpreted for over one hundred years.
Prior to its recent amendment, the statute provided:
When a cause of action has accrued in some other state or in a foreign country,
and by the law of such state or country, or of some other state and country where
the defendant has resided before he resided in this state, an action thereon cannot
be maintained by reason of lapse of time, then no action thereon shall be maintained in this state. 200
The courts' interpretation of the scope of the statute has always focused on
195. Several states, when reducing limitations periods for medical malpractice, for instance, have explicitly provided that contract as well as tort claims for professional malpractice are to be covered by a single
statute. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
196. Bowler v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 563 A.2d 344 (D.C. 1989). See also Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip.
Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
197. Bowler v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 563 A.2d 344 (D.C. 1989).
198. 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986).
199. Id. at 384.
200. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-65 (1972).
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the language "before he resided in this state." 20 1 The statute was limited in applicability to only those defendants who were nonresidents when a claim accrued and became barred under foreign law and who thereafter relocated in
Mississippi. 202 These defendants retained the protection of the law of a foreign state when they relocated to Mississippi.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, 203 and federal courts applying Mississippi
law, 204 held that the old section 15-1-65 did not apply to persons who were
residents of this state when a claim accrued against them under foreign law.
Corporations licensed to do business in this state when a claim accrued against
them in a foreign state could not use old section 15-1-65 to borrow the statute
of limitations of the state where the claim accrued. 205 So interpreted, the statute required borrowing of foreign statutes of limitations in very few cases. In
cases in which the defendant was a resident of this state 206 or licensed to do
business here 207 when a claim accrued against that defendant in another state,
the statute did not require borrowing of the foreign statute of limitations.
Without a statute requiring borrowing of foreign statutes of limitations for
claims accruing under the laws of another state, Mississippi courts generally
resorted to their traditional choice-of-law approach to limitations issues. 208 Typifying the supreme court's choice-of-law approach for choosing
201. Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug Inc., 415 F.2d
1009 (5th Cir. 1969), Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963); Jackson v. National Semi-Conductor
Data Checker/DTS Inc., 660 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 428 F. Supp.
646 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Stavang v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 227 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Miss.
1964), affd, 344 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1965).
202. See, e.g., Jackson v. National Semi-Conductor Data Checker/DTS Inc., 660 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Miss.
1986)(borrowing statute applied to cash register seller not doing business in Mississippi at time of injury);
Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 428 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Miss. 1977)(borrowing statute applied to manufacturer not qualified to do business in Mississippi at time of injury); Stavang v. American Potash & Chemical
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Miss. 1964), afftd, 344 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1977)(borrowing statute applied
to claim against clothing manufacturer doing business only in Delaware).
203. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor Mach., Inc., 529 So. 2d 606 (Miss. 1988); Shewbrooks v. A.C. &
S., Inc., 529 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1988); Vick v. Cochran, 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975).
204. See, e.g., Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Miss. 1975)(borrowing statute not applicable to resident's claim accruing in foreign state).
205. Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983)(borrowing statute not preclusive of suit
against defendant qualified to do business in Mississippi at time claim arose); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969)(borrowing statute not applicable to claim against drug company qualified to do business in Mississippi at time of injury); Fieldman v. Roper Corp., 586 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.
Miss. 1984)(borrowing statute not applicable to lawn mower manufacturer qualified to do business in Mississippi at time of injury).
206. See, e.g., Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
207. See, e.g., Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969).
208. Price v. Litton Sys., 784 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986)(two-year statute of limitations considered substantive part of Alabama wrongful death statute and applied in claim filed in Mississippi); Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984)(Tennessee statute of limitation applied to claim filed
in Mississippi based on "most significant relationship"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Vicon, Inc.
v. CMI Corp., 657 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1981)("center of gravity" test used to apply Tennessee law to claim
filed in Mississippi for tortious misrepresentation); Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.
1972)("most significant relationship" test used to apply Mississippi law to injury occurring in Mississippi
caused by Kentucky corporation and brought by Indiana domiciliaries in Mississippi forum), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 938 (1973); Ramsey v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970)("center of gravity" test used
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statutes of limitations is the case of Shewbrooks v. A. C. & S., Inc., 209 where
division in the court regarding this choice-of-law issue became obvious. Understanding the choice-of-law approaches advocated by the majority and the
dissenters in Shewbrooks is important, because it was in response to the choiceof-law approach used by the majority in Shewbrooks and in similar cases that
the legislature amended section 15-1-65.
In Shewbrooks, plaintiffs commenced a tort action in Mississippi seeking compensation for an occupational disease arising from plaintiffs employment in Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania and barred by the two-year limitations
periods of those states. 210 The action was held timely filed in Mississippi under the six-year catch-all statute of limitations. Other than the fact that the defendants were subject to the jurisdiction of the Mississippi court, the case had no
contacts with Mississippi. 211 Writing for a five-member majority of the court
in an opinion which revealed his strongly-held views regarding the role of courts
in innovation in the area of choice-of-law, Justice Hawkins refused the invitation of the defendants and of the minority to abandon the traditional choice-oflaw rule for limitations issues. Instead, Justice Hawkins reiterated the court's
long-standing position on the inapplicability of section 15-1-65, the borrowing
statute, and the applicability of section 15-1-49, the six-year, catch-all statute
of limitations, to claims such as the Shewbrooks'. 212 On the inapplicability of
the borrowing statute, section 15-1-65, to the Shewbrooks' claim, there was
no dissent. That borrowing statute was inapplicable because the defendants had
not relocated to Mississippi after the statute of limitations of a foreign state had
run on the plaintiffs' claims. 213 However, without a statute to require applicato apply Belgian statute of limitations to wrongful death claim filed in Mississippi on Belgian plane crash);
Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969)(forum Mississippi would apply its own statute of limitations because procedural rather than substantive); Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.
1963)(borrowing statute not applicable due to foreign tolling provision; Mississippi statute of limitations
would apply); Crouch v. General Elec. Co., 699 F. Supp. 585 (S.D. Miss. 1988)(tort and contract claim
held governed by North Carolina and Massachusetts laws, respectively, under "center of gravity" test; North
Carolina statute of repose held substantive, thus applicable to tort claim, but Massachusetts statute of limitations held procedural, thus Mississippi statute of limitations applied to contract claim); Jackson v. National
Semi-Conductor Data Checker/DTS, 660 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Miss. 1986)(Mississippi statute of limitations
applied to breach of warranty claim on procedural/substantive distinction); Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Miss. 1986)(Mississippi statute of limitations applied in breach
of implied warranty claim based on "center of gravity" test); Fieldman v. Roper Corp., 586 F. Supp. 936
(S.D. Miss. 1984)(action for lawn mower injury occurring in Kansas governed by Mississippi statute of
limitations as Kansas statute was procedural in nature); Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.
Miss. 1975)(Tennessee statute of limitations held procedural in wrongful death claim and Mississippi statute
of limitations applied); Williams v. Taylor Mach., Inc., 529 So. 2d 606 (Miss. 1988)(statute of limitations
held procedural, rejecting "center of gravity" test and applying statute of limitations of forum state); Browning v. Shackelford, 196 So. 2d 365 (Miss. 1967)(lex loci delecti applied Alabama substantive law to personal injury action, but Mississippi statute of limitations applied on procedural distinction); Guthrie v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 254 Miss. 532, 180 So. 2d 309 (1965)(forum statute of limitations applied).
209. 529 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1988).
210. Id. at 559.
211. Id. at 569 (Robertson, J., dissenting); id. and at 574 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 565-66.
213. Id. at 565 ; id. at 570 (Robertson, J., dissenting); see also White v. Malone Properties, Inc., 494
So. 2d 576, 579 (Miss. 1986)("§ 15-1-65 is concerned only with non-resident defendants who may move
to Mississippi after the accrual of an action against them in the state or country of their former residence").
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tion of a foreign statute of limitations, the court in Shewbrooks resorted to its
usual choice-of-law approach in order to determine what statutes of limitations
to apply to a case with little or no connection to Mississippi. 214
On this issue, the choice-of-law approach used in Mississippi is the Restatement Second approach to choice of law, which the supreme court judicially
adopted for tort actions in Mitchell v. Craft. 215 Under the Restatement Second
approach to choice-of-law, the court, using general principles enumerated in
the Restatement, determines which state has the most significant relationship
to particular issues in the case and then applies the law of that state to those
issues. 216 The most significant relationship approach of the Restatement is a
flexible issue-by-issue choice-of-law approach in which the court treats each
issue in the case separately for choice-of-law purposes. 217 For instance, the
court may determine that the law of one state controls the amount of plaintiff's
recoverable damages, while the law of another state determines the scope of
the defendant's affirmative defenses. 218
Although the choice-of-law principles of the Restatement Second are designed
to promote formulation of rules for certain cases, the Restatement Second generally favors an ad hoc approach to choice-of-law based on the most significant
relationship test. However, the Restatement Second does have some a priori
choice-of-law rules. On issues which the Restatement Second characterizes as
procedural issues, the forum court applies the law of the forum without consideration of which state has the most significant relationship to such issues. 219 The Second Restatement characterizes limitations issues as procedural,
and so periods of limitations are governed by the law of the forum. 20 Therefore,
following the Restatement Second approach in Shewbrooks, the court applied
Mississippi's six-year catch-all statute of limitations; and plaintiffs' claims, untimely elsewhere, were timely commenced in the forum of choice for forum
shoppers. 221
Disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in Shewbrooks was centered on whether the court should continue to follow the Restatement Second
choice-of-law approach on limitations issues. Continuing an assault on the court's
choice-of-law treatment of limitations issues begun in an earlier opin214. Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 566-68.
215. 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
216. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. REV. 501, 518 (1983);
Sutherland & Waxman, Florida'sApproach to Choice-of-Law Problems in Tort, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
447, 480 (1984).
217. Jackson, supra note 26, at 1208.
218. See, e.g., Fells v. Bowman, 274 So. 2d 109 (Miss. 1973) (Mississippi comparative negligence law
and Louisiana law of what constituted negligence applied in suit by Mississippi residents injured in Louisiana based on "most significant relationship" test).
219. Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So. 2d 557, 566 (Miss. 1988); see also Comment, Mississippi's
Statutes 9f Limitations and Choice of Law Analysis: A Borrowed Conflict, 57 Miss. L.J. 739, 743 (1987).
220. Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 566; id. at 571-73 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 567-68.
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ion, 222 Justice Robertson argued that the court should choose statutes of limitations using its usual choice-of-law approach for other substantive law
*
21
23 Under this view, the a priorirule of applying the forum's statute of
issues.
limitations would be abandoned in favor of an ad hoc approach of determining
in each case which state has the most significant relationship to the limitations
issue. 224 Once the state with the most significant relationship to the limitations
issues is determined, the statute of limitations of that state is applied. This choiceof-law approach to limitations issues was first adopted judicially in New Jersey225 and has been tentatively proposed to replace the existing Restatement
Second a priorirule. 226 As Justice Robertson indicated in his dissent, "where
there has been brought in this state an action that ought to be governed by the
law of another state, the viability of any limitations defense should also be adjudged by reference to the law of that other state."1227 To do otherwise was

to apply Mississippi's limitations law to cases in which the litigants and the underlying occurrence or transaction had no relationship to Mississippi other than
that the defendants could be sued there.
Underlying Justice Robertson's disagreement with the court's choice-of-law
approach in Shewbrooks was a dissatisfaction both with the distinction between
substance and procedure as a choice-of-law indicator and with the consequences
of the a priorirule on limitations. 228 In an earlier concurring opinion in White
v. Malone Properties,Inc., 229 Justice Robertson had criticized the Restatement
Second characterization of statutes of limitations as procedural. In that concurrence, Justice Robertson noted that the substance-procedure characterization
in the limitations context had its origin in a common-law distinction between
statutes of limitations which affect the right (and are therefore substantive) and
those which affect merely the remedy (and are, therefore, procedural). The
substance-procedure and right-remedy distinctions in the limitations context do
not appear to have any principled basis. A plaintiff confronted with a statute
of limitations which is characterized as merely barring his remedy is, of course,
no better off than a plaintiff confronting a statute of limitations which bars his
right. Rights without remedies are, as Professor Lorenzen noted seventy years
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

White v. Malone Properties, Inc., 494 So. 2d 576, 579-83 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring).
Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 571-74.
Id.
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 571 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 570 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 571-74 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
494 So. 2d 576 (Miss. 1986).

19891

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

ago, shorn of their most valuable attributes. 230 Characterizing foreign statutes
of limitations as procedural or substantive hardly provides the court a reasoned
basis for choosing to apply the statute of limitations of the forum or that of
another state. 231
Consequences of the automatic application of Mississippi's six-year statute
of limitations also were undesirable according to the dissenters in Shewbrooks.
That approach ensured that plaintiffs could achieve a better result on the limitations issue by bringing their actions, untimely where the claims accrued, into
Mississippi courts. 232 Forum shopping was promoted because the timeliness
of plaintiff's claims was controlled not by the law governing the plaintiff's substantive rights but by the law where the plaintiff chose to sue. 233 Uniform application of law was sacrificed by a choice-of-law rule under which a plaintiff's
right to choose the forum gave the plaintiff the power to choose a more favorable statute of limitations. Whether the choice of forum would serve as choiceof-law indicator if the defendant had the right to choose the forum may be
doubted.
Thus, the effect of applying the a priori choice-of-law rule to limitations issues was to make Mississippi a "dumping ground" 234 for out-of-state claims
which were brought here by forum-shopping counsel and litigants. 235 While
that characterization may or may not be fair, the lack of strong and consistent
opposition in the bar to applying the long period of limitations to out-of-state
claims may be related to the fact that the rule increases the frequency of claims
filed here. 236
Ironically, application of Mississippi's statute of limitations in cases like
Shewbrooks was inconsistent with the policies which statutes of limitations are
designed to promote. Statutes of limitations are designed to give plaintiffs a
reasonable time to commence valid claims and to create an incentive for prompt
action by plaintiffs. 237 Statutes of limitations are also designed to give defen230. Professor Lorenzen observed:
There is no reason, as regards statutes of limitation, either,why the internal test, which classifies
them as procedural or relating to the remedy, should be carried over into the conflict of laws. A
right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of its most valuable attribute.
After the enforcement of the right of action is gone under the law governing the rights of the parties,
it would seem clear upon principle that the same consequences should attach to the operative facts
everywhere.
Comment, supra note 35, at 496.
23 1. It is noteworthy that Justice Robertson has not challenged the rule that matters of procedure should
automatically be governed by the law of the forum in conflict-of-laws cases. He has merely argued that the
substance-procedure distinction does not provide a principled choice-of-law indicator on the limitations issues. He has not contended that the substance-procedure distinction should be entirely abandoned. For instance, Mississippi's procedures for selecting jurors are not subject to preemption by choice-of-law analysis.
232. Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 571 (Robertson, J.,dissenting); id. at 576-77 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
233. See, Comment, supra note 213 at 750-52.
234. Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 574 (Anderson, J.,dissenting).
235. Id. at 577 (Anderson, J., dissenting)(court is making itself a "doormat" for forum shoppers).
236. In that sense, applying the long statute of limitations to out-of-state claims was the closest thing Mississippi had to full-employment-for-lawyers legislation.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 32-42.
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dants and society security from claims which are not commenced in a reasonable time. 238 The choice-of-law rule used by the majority in Shewbrooks sacrificed
the defendant's interest in security, even in cases such as Shewbrooks, where
the plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to assert valid claims elsewhere and
merely slept on their rights. Application of the Restatement Second choice-oflaw rule on the limitations issue in Shewbrooks, therefore, promoted forum shopping while advancing none of the purposes behind statutes of limitations.
In short, the majority in Shewbrooks used a rule which required the automatic application of Mississippi's statute of limitations. According to Justice Hawkins,
adoption of a contrary rule limiting the legislative jurisdiction of the state on
limitations issues, if desirable, should be adopted by the legislature and not the
court. 239 Disagreeing with the proper role of the court in reducing the state's
legislative jurisdiction, Justice Robertson in his dissent argued that the court
should abandon its traditional approach to choice-of-law in the context of limitations issues. The dissenters argued that the Second Restatement a priori rule
for limitations issues should be modernized and that the Restatement's most significant relationship approach should be used for choosing statutes of limitations in cases with multistate contacts. 240 Had the court adopted the approach
suggested by Justice Robertson, it would have judicially created a choice-oflaw mechanism for borrowing statutes of limitations, consistent with the court's
choice-of-law jurisprudence, for cases in which limitations borrowing was not
required by statute.
B. 1988 Amendment to Section 15-1-65
Responding to Justice Hawkins' invitation to change the choice-of-law rule,
the legislature amended section 15-1-65 to broaden its application. Clearly, the
amendment is intended to overrule Shewbrooks on the choice-of-law issue. The
amended statute provides:
When a cause of action has accrued outside of this state, and by the laws of
the place outside this state where such cause of action accrued, an action thereon
cannot be maintained by reason of lapse of time, then no action thereon shall
be maintained in this state; provided however, that where such a cause of action
has accrued in favor of a resident of this state, this state's law on the period of
limitation shall apply. 241
The purpose behind borrowing statutes is primarily to reduce forum shopping. 242 By requiring Mississippi courts to apply the statute of limitations of
the state where the claim accrued, this borrowing statute ensures that the plaintiff's choice of forum will not give the plaintiff the advantage of a more favora238. Id.
239. Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 568.
240. Id. at 570-74 (Robertson, J., dissenting); id. at 574-76 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
241. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-65 (Supp. 1989).
242. Ester, supra note 35, at 40-41; Milhollin, supra note 33, at 28-29.
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ble statute of limitations. 2,3 By making choice-of-law determinations on
limitations issues independent from the choice of forum, borrowing statutes promote uniformity of result on limitations. 244 Theoretically at least, borrowing
statutes ensure that on limitations issues, different courts will reach the same
determination on the timeliness of the plaintiff's claims. 245 The incentive to
forum shop is reduced, while incentives such as access to evidence and witnesses and familiarity of local courts with governing law remain to encourage
plaintiffs to litigate where the claim accrued.
Consistent with the purposes behind statutes of limitations, borrowing statutes promote the defendant's interest in security from stale claims. 246 This is
accomplished without sacrificing the plaintiff's interest in having a reasonable
time to commence valid claims since the borrowing statute will not reduce the
applicable period of limitations. Underlying borrowing statutes is the notion
that it is unfair to allow a plaintiff to recover in the forum after the plaintiff's
claim has become barred by the laws of the jurisdiction where it arose. 247
By amending section 15-1-65, the legislature has established a choice-of-law
rule for limitations issues. On claims accruing out of state, no claim can be
maintained in Mississippi if the claim is barred by the law where the claim accrued. 248 The statute appears straightforward. The legislature has created the
rule of what period of limitations to apply. No choice-of-law determination appears necessary fcr the court. The court need only turn the handle and apply
that legislatively mandated rule. However, as will be discussed below, in order
to apply this choice-of-law rule, Mississippi courts must first determine where
the plaintiff's claims accrued, a sometimes difficult determination. Making that
determination presumes some choice-of-law decision by the court. Whether the
legislature adopted Justice Robertson's suggestion in Shewbrooks that an ad hoc
approach be utilized in determining choice-of-law questions on limitations issues is unclear. However, as will be seen, when determining how to apply the
243. Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: BorrowingStatutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
287, 297-98 (1960).
244. Id. at 297.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. It has been asserted that a plaintiff should not sit by and let his claim run. According to Vernon:
[T]he very enactment of limitation laws amounts to a legislative assertion that a claimant who sits
on his claim is at fault. The legitimate right of the plaintiff to obtain relief must be balanced against
the equally legitimate right of the defendant to be free of the claim after the passage of a reasonable
period of time. Encouragement of future commercial activity and freedom of movement seems to
call for a reasonably certain cut-off point. Indefinite delays in the barring of actions place an added
burden on an already strained court. system by permitting the trial of stale claims in which evidence
and witnesses are uncertain or unavailable.
Vernon, supra note 237, at 297.
248. The statute is silent on what approach the court should take in the rare case where Mississippi statutes of limitation would bar the claim but the claim would not be barred by the laws of the place where
the claim accrued. Presumably, such claims cannot be maintained in Mississippi. That approach is consistent with the the Restatement Second on this issue and with the traditional rule that courts do not hear claims
which would be barred by the law of the forum. That approach likewise discourages forum shopping, which
is consistent with the policy behind the borrowing statute.
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legislature's rule, the court may need to follow the ad hoc approach suggested
by Justice Robertson in his dissent in Shewbrooks.
C. Interpreting Amended Section 15-1-65
1. Where Do These Claims Accrue?
Section 15-1-65 requires that no claim arising under the law of another state
shall be brought in Mississippi if the claim would be untimely under the law
of the state where it accrued. The language of amended section 15-1-65 speaks
of claims "accruling] outside of this state" and becoming barred by lapse of
time "by the laws of the place outside this state where such cause of action accrued." Of course, determining whether a claim is barred by the laws of another
state depends in part on applicable law regarding where the claim accrued and
whether the limitations period is or has been tolled.
Determining where claims arise or accrue for the purposes of borrowing statutes has been a difficult issue for many courts. Thirty years ago, Professor
Ester was able to say with confidence that for the purposes of borrowing statutes, tort claims accrue where the injury or harm occurred. 2419However, fifteen
years after Professor Ester's comment, Professor Milhollin noted that "[o]n a
purely literal level, it is surprising to find a court which can still say that a cause
of action is created 'at' a physical location.""' Obviously, these two commentators are describing distinctly different approaches to questions of accrual. At
the time that Professor Ester wrote his leading article on borrowing statutes,
courts used a so-called territorial approach when determining where a claim
accrued. 251 The process of determining where a claim accrued required the
court to locate the significant event in time and space (e.g., in a tort action,
the place where the harm occurred) in order to determine where a claim accrued or arose. The place where the last significant event occurred was the place
where the claim "accrued" and the law of that place (e.g., the statute of limitations) was applicable. This approach still dominates thinking in this area and
is still used in Mississippi to determine where a claim accrues for the purposes
of laying venue. 252
In the context of borrowing statutes, determining where a claim accrued requires first a choice-of-law decision, which under the territorial approach was
often made implicitly by the court. A claim does not simply accrue. A claim
accrues only if applicable law says that it accrues. 253 The statement, "the sta249. Ester, supra note 35, at 47; see also Vernon, supra note 237, at 300-06.
250. Milhollin, supra note 33, at 26.
251. Vernon, supra note 237, at 302 ("Traditionally, it has been thought that a cause of action arises at
the time when and the place where the wrongful act or omission occurs.").
252. See generally Abbott, Venue of TransitoryActions Against Resident Individual Citizens in MississippiStatutory Revision Could Remove Needless Complexity, 58 Miss. L.J. 1 (1988)[hereinafter Abbot, Venue
of Transitory Actions].
253. Milhollin, supra note 33, at 26.

19891

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

tute of limitations of state X applies because the claim accrued there," first assumes simply that the law of X is applicable, in order to conclude that under
the law of X a claim accrued. 214 When identifying where a claim accrued for
the purposes of a borrowing statute, courts are first making a choice-of-law
decision that the law of a particular jurisdiction is applicable and under that
law the claim accrued. The fact that courts have used a territorial approach and
have not explicitly identified that they are making choice-of-law decisions does
not change the fact that such decisions are made by courts in determining where
a claim accrued. 255
An unusual case which demonstrates this point clearly is the Wyoming decision of Duke v. Housen. 256 In Duke the plaintiff sued the defendant for sexually transmitting gonorrhea to her. 257 The jurisdiction in which the plaintiff
contracted the disease was a matter of dispute; the plaintiff and defendant, enroute to Wyoming, had sexual intercourse in New York, Pennsylvania, Iowa,
and Nebraska. 258 Later, in New York, the defendant disclosed to the plaintiff
that he had the disease and that he might have transmitted it to her. 259 The
plaintiffs infection was diagnosed in Washington, D.C. 260 Applying the Wyoming borrowing statute, which looked to the limitations period of the state where
the "cause of action arose," the court held, almost by process of elimination,
that New York's statute would apply. The court noted that, under the laws of
Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Nebraska, no claim could have accrued because claims
accrue in those states only upon discovery of injury. 261 The court in Duke apparently believed that a claim could not arise under the law of any of these states
if it were discovered elsewhere. 262 The law of Washington, D.C., which recognized a claim upon discovery of the injury, was ruled out because, although
the injury was discovered there, no tortious conduct occurred there. 263 New
York's statute of limitations was applied because under New York law the claim
accrued there at the time the injury was received. 264
Of course, to find that a claim accrued in New York under its territorial approach, the court needed to locate in New York the last significant event necessary to establish the existence of a claim under New York law. To do this, a
majority of the court had to assume the infection was contracted there. Using
the territorial approach to decide where the claim arose, the court essentially
254. Id.
255. See generally Milhollin, supra note 33, at 26-40.
256. 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979). See generally Note, Conflict of LawsAn Interest Analysis Approach to Wyoming's Borrowing Statute, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 717 (1980).
257. Duke, 589 P.2d at 339.
258. Id. at 344.
259. Id. at 338.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 353.
262. Note, supra note 250, at 723-24; see generally Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict
of Laws: Modem Analysis, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1 (1980).
263. Duke, 589 P.2d at 352-53; Note, supra note 243, at 723.
264. Duke, 589 P.2d at 352.
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chose, first, to apply New York law to the event it assumed occurred there and,
second, to conclude that under New York law the claim arose or accrued there.
Therefore, the conclusion that the claim accrued in New York and that, consequently, the borrowing statute required application of New York's statute of
limitations could only be reached if the court first chose to apply New York
law to the events in issue 265 and chose not to apply the law of the other states,
including Wyoming, involved in the underlying transaction.
Duke and several other cases 266 illustrate that in order for a court to determine which statute of limitations to apply under a borrowing statute the court
must first make some choice-of-law decision to determine under the law of which
state a claim arises or accrues. The territorial approach used in Duke was difficult
for the court, because that approach required the court to identify and then attach choice-of-law significance to a single event in time and space (the place
where the harm occurred or was discovered) and the facts of the case did not
lend themselves to such identification.
Whether the territorial approach to choice-of-law should be used under borrowing statutes is debatable. That it is the choice-of-law method most used in
determining where claims accrued cannot be questioned. 267 Although the ter265. In a concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the claim accrued only when discovered and, therefore, the law of Washington, D.C., should apply. Duke, 589 P.2d at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring). A dissenting justice argued that because the state where the injury occurred could not be determined the borrowing
statute was inapplicable and the claim should be held timely unless barred by the statutes of all states where
it conceivably could have arisen. Duke, 589 P.2d at 354 (McClintock, J., dissenting).
266. The multistate aspect of Duke, in which tortious conduct occurs in one state and injury is realized
in another, is not unique in cases dealing with borrowing statutes. In Finnegan v. Squire Publishers, 765
S.W.2d 703 (Mo. App. 1989) for instance, a Kansas resident who was an attorney licensed only to practice
law in Missouri, brought an action in Missouri against a Kansas publisher for a libelous advertisement published in Kansas and disseminated in both Kansas and Missouri. The plaintiff contended that because he
could practice law only in Missouri his claim accrued in Missouri where he suffered injury to his professional reputation by dissemination of the libel, rather than Kansas, where the material was first published. Kansas had a one-year limitations period which would bar the action; Missouri had a two-year limitations period
under which the action would have been timely. Interpreting its borrowing statute as requiring it to apply
the statute of limitations of the state where a claim "originated", the court held that the claim originated or
accrued in Kansas. Id. at 706. This result was the only one consistent with the policy of reducing forum
shopping behind the borrowing statute. The problem of determining where a claim accrued has not been
limited to tort claims. Professor Ester, in his study of borrowing statutes, noted that the determination of
where a contract claim arises or accrues is "fraught with ambiguity." Ester, supra note 35, at 48. For instance, does a claim on a promissory note accrue where the note was made, where it was payable, where
the maker repudiated liability, where the maker lived when executing the note or when the note became
payable, or where the payee resides? Not surprisingly, various conclusions have been reached on the accrual
issue in contracts cases. See, e.g., Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97,
403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978) (plaintiffs breach of warranty claim, like his tort claim, accrued in Virginia where
the injury occurred and not in New York where the product which caused the injury was manufactured;
thus, Virginia's statute of limitations applied). Numerous opinions on accrual under borrowing statutes are
discussed in detail in Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 52 N.C.L. REv. 489, 520-33
(1974) and Milhollin, supra note 33, at 27-35.
267. See, e.g., Doris v. McLanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1987)(Missouri's borrowing statute requires
application of Illinois' statute of limitations in action arising from automobile accident in Illinois); Guertin
v. Harbour Assurance Co, 135 Wis. 2d 334, 400 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), affd, 141 Wis. 2d
622, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987)(for the purposes of borrowing statute, accrual occurs at the time and place
of injury); Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97,403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978)(New
York's borrowing statute requires application of Virginia's statute of limitations to claim of resident of District of Columbia arising from injury occuring in Virginia.).

1989]

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

ritorial approach is not without its proponents, critics of the approach argue
that in cases such as Duke choice-of-law decisions should be made by looking
to the interests or relationships of the states involved in order to determine which
law should be applied. 268 Rather than holding that the law of New York applies because harm probably occurred there, the court should consider why the
law of New York or some state should be preferred over the limitations laws
of the other states interested or related to the transaction in litigation.
Putting aside until later what choice-of-law rule should be used by Mississippi courts when interpreting amended section 15-1-65, the point here is simply
that by incorporating the provision requiring the court to determine where outof-state claims accrued, the amendment to section 15-1-65 by the legislature
now requires the court to make a choice-of-law decision when determining what
statute of limitations to borrow. The fact that the choice-of-law decision is made
by determining where a claim accrued does not make it any less a choice-oflaw decision. When the court faces a case in which a claim may accrue in more
than one foreign jurisdiction, it must determine which statute of limitations to
apply by determining where the claim accrued.
How the Mississippi legislature intended for the court to make the determination of where claims accrued is unclear. What little legislative history there
is regarding the amendment of section 15-1-65 is silent on the issue of accrual.
Also, there are no recent judicial decisions in which the court determined where
a claim accrued for choice-of-law purposes. Because the former borrowing statute, section 15-1-65, had been construed as applicable to so few cases arising
out of state, decisions in Mississippi involving statute of limitations issues generally focused on when a claim accrued, and not on where it accrued. 269 Since
the Supreme Court of Mississippi adopted the most significant relation-center
of gravity test to determine applicable law, the court has not found it necessary
to ask where a claim accrued since choice-of-law determinations are no longer
controlled by such considerations.
Prior to the adoption of the most significant relation-center of gravity test,
all of the earlier Mississippi decisions 270 used a territorial approach when determining where a claim with multistate contacts accrued. In contracts cases,
for instance, the rule from C & L Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Kincade 271 that a cause of action accrues where the contract is to be performed
was generally followed. 272 Similarly, the territorial approach has been followed
in determining where tort claims accrued for the purposes of Mississippi's venue
268. See generally Milhollin, supra note 33.
269. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
270. By earlier decisions, I mean those predating the adoption of the "center of gravity-most significant
relationship" test.
271. C & L Rural Electric Coop. Corp. v. Kincade, 175 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Miss. 1959), affd, 276
F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1960).
272. C & L Rural Electric Coop. Corp. v. Kincade, 175 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Miss. 1959), affd, 276
F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1960); Southern Wholesalers, Inc. v. Stennis Drug Co., 214 Miss. 461, 59 So. 2d 78 (1952).
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statute. 273 For instance, the rule that tort claims accrue in the county where
the harm occurred has been consistently applied by Mississippi courts. Decisions which used the territorial approach generally fall into two categories. Some
of the cases dealing with the issue of where a claim accrued pre-date the adoption of the Restatement Second approach to choice-of-law in cases with multistate contacts. The rest of the cases deal with laying venue in cases with no
multistate contacts. Cases in the former group rely on a choice-of-law rule discredited by the adoption of the Restatement Second approach. Cases in the latter group are not choice-of-law cases at all. 274 Therefore, these decisions
probably will be of little value in interpreting how determinations of "where
a claim accrued" should be made under amended section 15-1-65.
If the court rejects the territorial approach to where a claim accrued, it can
instead turn to its usual choice-of-law process, determine where a claim accrued by determining which state has the most significant relationship to the
issue of limitations. Using its choice-of-law method, the court can determine
the state with the most significant relation to the claim generally, or the limitations issue in particular; and for the purposes of the borrowing statute it can
treat the claim as having accrued in that state. With no legislative history to
guide the court toward utilizing either the territorial approach to accrual determinations or alternatively the court's usual "most significant relationship" methodology, it appears that the court should favor its usual choice-of-law test.
Certainly, given the court's long-standing adherence to the Restatement Second
approach to choice of law, the legislature can be presumed to have recognized
the probability that this approach would be utilized when the court applies amended section 15-1-65. Apart from the question of legislative intent, which admittedly is unclear, the argument in favor of using the most significant relationship
test for accrual determinations is, after all, the same argument which was articulated in Mitchell v. Craft 275 for using the Restatement Second approach for
other choice-of-law issues. 276 The court adopted the Restatement Second approach in Mitchell because it believed that the territorial approach of lex loci
delicti, which attached choice-of-law significance to the location of a single act
or transaction, did not provide a reasoned basis for choice of law in many cases
with multistate contacts. By using its ordinary choice-of-law process on the issue of accrual, the court can avoid the problems encountered by courts in cases
such as Duke, in which, when using the territorial approach, courts appeared
to have difficulty establishing any reasoned basis for why the claim was accruing in one state, rather than in several others, or in more than one state simul273. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3 (Supp. 1989). See generally Abbott, supra note 246.
274. The venue cases deal not with legislative jurisdiction, but with matters of litigant and court convenience.
275. 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
276. "The only virtue of invariably applying the rule of the place of the injury is that it is easy for a court
to apply. Nevertheless, in many cases . . . it bears no relation to any rational criteria for choosing one law
against another in a torts-conflicts case." Id. at 513.
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taneously. 277 Unless the court no longer believes in the merits of the Restatement
Second approach to choice-of-law, it probably should use that approach when
interpreting section 15-1-65. Interestingly, the expected effect of using a most
significant relationship test for determining where a claim accrues will be that
the court will be adopting an approach for amended section 15-1-65 which is
nearly indistinguishable from the approach to choosing applicable statutes of
limitations which Justice Robertson unsuccessfully advocated when interpreting old section 15-1-65. 278 The only distinction between the choice-of-law
method required of the court under amended section 15-1-65 and that unsuccessfully advocated by Justice Robertson in Shewbrooks is the terminology to
be used in the choice-of-law inquiry. Amended section 15-1-65 requires the
court to determine which state has the most significant relationship to the claim
in order to determine where it accrued. Once the state with the most significant
relationship to the claim is established, the claim is said to have accrued in that
state; and then under the amended statute the law of that state applies to the
limitations issue. Of course, when the court determines under amended section
15-1-65 which state has the most significant relationship to the claim, by definition the court is also determining that the law of that state governs the claim
itself. Therefore, under the interpretation offered in this article to section 15-1-65,
the law of the state governing the claim will always govern on the limitations
issue.
Justice Robertson's choice-of-law approach, of course, did not require any
inquiry into where the claim accrued. However, apart from the fact that his
choice-of-law method did not use the new statutory terminology of accrual, the
choice-of-law method he advocated is identical to that which should be required
of the court when making accrual determinations under amended section 15-1-65.
277. The Restatement Second approach avoids any possibility that the law of two states might apply to
a single issue because that approach requires determination of the single state with the most significant relationship to an issue. Note that Justice McClintock in his dissent in Duke believed that the limitations period
of more than one state could be applicable to a claim. He argued that because the location of the tort could
not be determined, the court could not say that the claim accrued in any one of the several jurisdictions
in which the plaintiff and defendant had traveled and, therefore, the court should hold that the claim was
not barred unless barred by the statutes of limitation of all of the affected states. Duke, 589 P.2d at 354
(McClintock, J., dissenting). Professor Ester noted in his article that a couple of courts had recognized that
a claim could arise or accrue in more than one jurisdiction. He argued that where courts so held the court
should treat a claim as barred if it would be barred by any of the applicable statutes of limitation. This approach he believed was consistent with the policy behind borrowing statutes, which was to allow the plaintiff
an opportunity to commence his action. Plaintiffs who have had that opportunity in one jurisdiction should
not be given the opportunity in another. Ester, supra note 35, at 50.
278. As earlier noted, Justice Robertson argued strongly that when determining what statute of limitation
should be applied in cases where borrowing was not required by old § 15-1-65 the court was making a choiceof-law decision which should be made using the court's usual approach to choice of law, the center of gravitymost significant relationship approach. He asserted that when determining which statute of limitation to apply, the court, using its choice-of-law analysis for other substantive law issues, should apply the law of the
state which has the most significant relationship to the limitation issue. Amended § 15-1-65, which legislatively overrules the court's decisions regarding borrowing statutes of limitation, now requires the court to
make a choice-of-law decision much like the one advocated by Justice Robertson. Supra, note 239 and
accompanying text.
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In Justice Robertson's method, as in the method proposed here under amended
section 15-1-65, the court determines which state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties and then applies the limitations law
of that state. 279
Whether the court will interpret amended section 15-1-65 to require it to use
a territorial or Restatement Second approach on determination of where a claim
accrued is an open question. If the court follows a Restatement Second approach
to determine where a claim accrued, it will use a single choice-of-law test for
all issues in the case. If the court rejects the Restatement Second approach and
uses a territorial approach to determine where a claim accrued, it will have two
choice-of-law processes, a territorial one for determining where a claim accrued under the borrowing statute and a second one utilizing the center of gravitymost significant relationship approach for all other choice-of-law determinations. 280 Whichever approach is chosen, the court will be making choice-oflaw determinations when it decides where a foreign cause of action accrued.
2. Tolling Provisions of the State Where the Claim Accrued
A related problem for courts when interpreting amended section 15-1-65 is
that of tolling provisions of the states where claims accrue. Should our courts,
when borrowing statutes of limitations of another jurisdiction, also borrow the
tolling provisions from that state? If tolling provisions are not borrowed, should
the Mississippi court apply its own tolling provisions when determining when
an action is timely under the statute of limitations of another jurisdiction?
Although there is disagreement on whether tolling provisions should be borrowed, a majority of courts which have considered the issue construe their borrowing statutes to require borrowing of tolling rules of the jurisdiction whose
279. Determining which state has the most significant relationship to the parties and the occurrences in
general, or to the limitations issue in particular, is not free from difficulty. New Jersey courts, where the
most significant relationship approach was first adopted judicially for choice-of-law determinations on limitations issues, have had difficulty applying the test. For instance, in Seckular v. Celotex, 209 N.J. Super.
242, 507 A.2d 290 (1986), a Florida resident's tort action for asbestos exposure was dismissed by the court
without prejudice after the court was unable to determine what statute of limitations to apply. The court
found that the substantive law of Florida would govern the plaintiffs actions, but it was unable to decide
whether Florida would apply its own limitations law (Florida was the place where the injury became manifest)
or New York's limitations law (New York was the locus of the plaintiffs exposure). Supra, note 239 and
accompanying text.
Mississippi courts may be able to avoid this problem because under Justice Robertson's approach a choiceof-law analysis is not performed separately to determine which law applies to the claim and which law to
the defense of limitations. The court determines the state which has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties and then applies that law to the claim and the applicable defenses, including the
defense of limitations. Therefore, the issue-by-issue approach used by the New Jersey court is not employed
in Mississippi on limitations issues.
280. Dorris v. McClanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1987)(en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court, for
instance, has rejected the contention that it should apply its usual Restatement Second approach to choice-oflaw when determining where a claim accrued for the purposes of its borrowing statute. That court has held
that by enacting the borrowing statute the legislature preempted the Restatement Second approach generally
used by the court in choice-of-law cases in favor of a territorial approach of locating where the claim accrued. Id. at 872.

1989]

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

statute of limitations will be applied.

York courts.

282

Two Ohio courts,

283

21

This has long been the rule in New

on the other hand, construed the Ohio

borrowing statute as requiring the court to apply the foreign limitations period
only, without regard to any tolling provisions, including those of Ohio. Under
this approach, an Ohio court held that the claim of a West Virginia resident,
commenced in Ohio more than one year after the claim accrued in West Virginia, was barred under West Virginia's one-year statute of limitations without
regard to the fact that West Virginia had a statute which would have tolled the
statute of limitations during the defendant's absence from that state. 284
The Ohio cases demonstrate clearly both the problem for the plaintiff with
not borrowing tolling provisions when using a borrowing statute and the merits
of this approach. The approach used by the Ohio court in effect barred an action which accrued in West Virginia even though the action would not have
been barred had it been commenced in West Virginia. Of course, as a practical
matter, the proliferation of long-arm statutes will reduce, if not eliminate, this
problem because using a long-arm statute the plaintiff can commence his action in the place where the claim accrued. 285 The merit of not borrowing foreign tolling provisions is that forum shopping is discouraged. The plaintiff is
given an incentive to commence his action in the state where the claim accrued.
By not borrowing tolling provisions, courts also avoid the possibility that a
limitations period can be extended by tolling, subjecting the defendant to perpetual liability. This is illustrated by the famous case of West v. Theis28 in
which the defendant was sued in Idaho eighteen years after a claim on a note
accrued in Kansas. Because Kansas had a tolling provision which tolled the statute
of limitations while the defendant was absent from the state, the defendant's
permanent removal from that state meant that the Kansas statute of limitations
would never be tolled as to plaintiff's claim. 287 Tolling provisions which toll
a period of limitations during the defendant's absence from the forum state are
anachronisms, given the fact that long-arm statutes now permit service of process
on persons out of state who are subject to the personal jurisidiction of the forum. However, the continued vitality of such tolling provisions makes borrow281. See Antone v. General Motors, 64 N.Y.2d 20, 473 N.E.2d 742 (1984); Ester, supra note 35, at
56-57; Vernon, supra note 237, at 307-08. See also Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflicts of Laws,
supra note 265, at 519-32. See generally Vernon, supra note 242.
282. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97,403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978)(Virginia
statute of limitations and tolling provisions borrowed for claim of resident of District of Columbia arising
from accident in Virginia).
283. Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960); Palmieri v. Ahart, 111 Ohio App. 195, 167
N.E.2d 353 (1960).
284. Palmieri v. Ahart, Ill Ohio App. 195, 167 N.E.2d 353 (1960).
285. But see Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Estate of Hughes, 99 Nev. 166,659 P.2d 871 (1983)(recognizing
continued viability of provision tolling period of limitations during the defendant's absence from state, after
noting that long arm-statute makes such provisions unnecessary to protect interests of the plaintiff).
286. 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908).
287. Id. The fact that the defendant had resided in Washington for the period of limitatiol under Washington
law and in Idaho for the period of limitation under Idaho law was considered of no merit. Id.
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ing tolling provisions of foreign states problematic. Clearly, subjecting defendants
to perpetual liability is inconsistent with the general purposes of statute of limitations reform in Mississippi: reducing the number of older claims filed in this
state.
Whether the legislature intended that tolling provisions should be borrowed
by the court when applying amended section 15-1-65 is by no means clear. The
approach of borrowing tolling provisions of the state whose statute of limitations applies seems consistent with the language of amended section 15-1-65,
which states that a claim is barred in Mississippi only when it is barred under
the law of the state where it accrued. Unless "laws" is read to mean "the statute
of limitations only" of the foreign state, section 15-1-65 probably will be construed to require borrowing of tolling provisions. If the claim is not barred in
the jurisdiction where it arose because of that jurisdiction's tolling provisions,
then that action should not be barred here. Conversely, where another jurisdiction lacks tolling provisions for a claim which, if it accrued in Mississippi, would
be subject to tolling provisions, the plaintiff would not be able to avail himself
of Mississippi's tolling provision in order to save the claim. 288
As noted above, not borrowing tolling provisions will reduce the number of
out of state claims brought to Mississippi courts. This appears consistent with
the purpose of the borrowing statute in particular and with all of the amended
statutes of limitations in general. Mississippi has narrowly construed its own
provision for tolling limitations periods for claims accruing here during periods when a defendant is absent from this state. That construction of the Mississippi tolling provision suggests that the court will narrowly construe tolling
provisions, so as not to give the plaintiff more than a reasonable opportunity
to commence his action against the defendant. Clearly, precedent in Mississippi suggests that tolling provisions should not be utilized, or borrowed, to subject defendants to perpetual liability. Therefore, interpreting section 15-1-65
as not requiring borrowing of tolling provisions will reduce forum shopping
and the number of claims filed in Mississippi, consistent with the general purposes behind statutes of limitations in general and borrowing statutes in particular. However, interpreting section 15-1-65 to require borrowing, while
inconsistent with the policies of reducing claims frequency and forum shopping, is consistent with the literal language of the statute. 289
288. Of course, interpreting amended § 15-1-65 as requiring borrowing tolling provisions is also consistent with the court's choice-of-law approach. By borrowing the tolling provisions of the place with the most
significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence, the court will be applying the borrowing provisions
of the state whose law governs the plaintiffs claim and the defense of limitations.
289. As to claims of residents accruing out of state, some courts borrow the foreign period of limitations
but apply the tolling provision of the forum. See, e.g., Davis v. McLanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo.
1987)(Missouri's borrowing statute requires application of Illinois' statute of limitations in action arising from
an automobile accident in Illinois, but Missouri applies its own infant tolling provisions); DeVito v. Blenc,
47 Mich. App. 524, 209 N.W.2d 728 (1973)(Ontario's statute of limitations governed action between two
Michigan residents, but Michigan's infant tolling provisions applied). The situation is not possible in Mississippi because claims of residents are not subject to the borrowing statute.
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3. Renvoi
Earlier, I stated that the statute of limitations of the place where the claim
accrued should be applied to the claim under amended section 15-1-65. The
unspoken premise of that statement is that when applying amended section
15-1-65 the court should not utilize the doctrine of renvoi. 290 A Mississippi
court when applying section 15-1-65 should ignore the choice-of-law rules of
the state where the claim accrued. Once the court determines where the claim
accrued, the court should apply the statute of limitations of that state without
considering whether that state would itself apply its own statute of limitations
to the claim or whether that state would apply the statute of limitations of a
third state or perhaps the statute of limitations of the forum.
An example will illustrate how renvoi could be used when interpreting section 15-1-65. Assume that Mississippi and Alabama residents are traveling on
vacation in a third state which does not have a borrowing statute and which,
like New Jersey, applies the statute of limitations of the state with the most
significant relationship to the limitations issue. 291 The third state has a twoyear statute of limitations for tort claims. Its rules for determining when an
action accrues are similar (and for the purposes of this hypothetical example
presumed identical) to those of Mississippi. The travelers are involved in an
automobile accident which is caused by the alleged negligence of the Mississippi resident. The Alabama resident, who is seriously injured, brings an action in Mississippi against the Mississsippi resident two and one-half years after
the action accrued under the law of the third state. Admittedly, the action would
be untimely if the statute of limitations of the third state is applied. However,
since the third state utilizes the most significant relationship test to determine
what statute of limitations to apply, it is not clear that, had the Alabama resident sued the Mississippi resident in the third state, that the third state would
apply its own period of limitations to bar the claim.
Should a Mississippi court in the hypothetical case declare that the action is
barred under the two-year statute of limitations of the third state? Should it determine whether, under choice-of-law rules of the third state, the courts of the
third state would apply its law or the law of Mississippi, of Alabama, or of
some other state?
There is no indication that the legislature ever considered the doctrine of renvoi
when it debated amending section 15-1-65. The possiblity looms that Mississippi, using renvoi under section 15-1-65, could look to the law of another state,
which using the renvoi doctrine on the limitations issue, could look back to
Mississippi law to resolve the issue. Theoretically, each state could continually
290. See Wurfel, supra note 265, at 531-32.
291. That hypothetical location is chosen for this example because of its approach to the statute of limitations problems.
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be referring back to the law of the other. 292
Whether the doctrine of renvoi should be applied under 15-1-65 depends on
which of two interpretations the court gives to the amended statute. The statute
could be construed as requiring application of the statute of limitations of the
state where the claim accrued. Under this interpretation of section 15-1-65, the
court should determine where the claim accrued and then apply to the claim
the statute of limitations of that place. Choice-of-law rules of the place where
the claim accrued should not be consulted. The statute of limitations of that
place should be applied without inquiry into whether that place, were it the forum for the action, would apply its own statute.
In the alternative, section 15-1-65 may be interpreted as requiring the court
to apply whatever statute of limitations would be applied to the claim by the
courts of the state where the claim accrued. Under this interpretation, renvoi
is utilized; and Mississippi courts, when adjudicating cases under section 15-1-65,
should apply whatever limitations statutes or rules would be applied by the courts
of the place where the claim arose. If the courts of the third state would utilize
choice-of-law rules to apply a statute of limitations other than the one of that
state, then the Mississippi court should do likewise under section 15-1-65. The
renvoi doctrine ensures, at least theoretically, that claims will be treated in Mississippi courts as they would be treated in the third state.
Section 15-1-65 provides that a claim barred by the law of another state is
barred herein. Proponents of renvoi will argue that, where the third state would
not apply its own statute of limitations to bar a claim, the Mississippi court
likewise should not bar the claim because the claim is not barred under the law
of the third state. Following this approach, a New York court in Knieriemen
v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. 293 interpreted its borrowing statute as requiring reference to Louisiana's choice-of-law rules in an action for securities
"churning" which accrued in Louisiana. Since the court found that Louisiana
would apply the law of the forum on the limitations issue, the court applied
New York's statute of limitations. 294 Interpreting section 15-1-65 as requiring
utilization of renvoi, therefore, is not inconsistent with the language of section
15-1-65.
Legislative history for the recent amendments to section 15-1-65 is silent on
the issue of renvoi. This is not surprising. Although the Committee on Uniform Laws, when drafting the Uniform Conflict of Limitations Act, apparently
had some debate on Dean Griswold's proposal to include a provision for renvoi
in the uniform act, 295 the legislature of this state apparently did not consider
292. Deans Scoles and Hay have asserted that this circularity often will not occur. E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
69 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
293. 427 N.Y.S.2d 10, 74 A.D.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). Accord Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco
Assoc., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 372 N.E.2d 555 (1977)(dicta).
294. Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 10, 74 A.D.2d 290 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1980).
295. Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 MERCER L. REV. 461, 477 (1984).
CONFLICT OF LAws
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the doctrine of renvoi. Making a reasonable or reasoned guess as to the legislature's intent about something the legislature did not consider is difficult.
Some observations regarding renvoi in the context of borrowing statutes can,
however, be made. If the legislature intends that, for the purposes of limitations, when applying section 15-1-65 our courts theoretically should reach the
same results as a court in the state where the claim accrued, then renvoi should
be required. However, as Professor Leflar has noted when discussing the Uniform Conflict of Limitations Act, the theoretical certainty which renvoi seeks
to achieve seldom, if ever, comports well with the expectations of the parties. 296 Using renvoi is a complicating task for judicial processes. Choice-oflaw rules of many states are in flux, and the status of a choice of law in another
state would in many cases be difficult to determine. 297 Even if choice-of-law
rules of another state could be accurately determined, it is far from certain that
when applying those rules Mississippi courts would achieve the same result as
would the courts of the third state. Use of the renvoi doctrine probably will
only increase uncertainty on limitations issues, where the parties need some
reasonable basis to determine when a claim should be brought or is untimely. 298
Section 15-1-65 is silent on renvoi, unlike the Uniform Conflict of Limitations Act, which expressly excludes consideration of the choice-of-law rules
of another state when determining limitations issues. 299 That silence, however,
should not be seen as legislative adoption of the doctrine which heretofore has
never been judicially recognized in Mississippi in any context. To suggest that
the legislature, by silence, intended for the court to incorporate renvoi into section
15-1-65 is not credible. Therefore, the doctrine should not be used when determining the applicable statute of limitations under amended section 15-1-65.
D. The Exception For Residents; Is It Constitutional?
The final provision of amended 15-1-65 provides that, as to out-of-state claims
accruing to residents of this state, the statute of limitations of this state shall
apply. This provision, which is similar to those exceptions for residents' claims
contained in the borrowing statutes of other states, has the potential of giving
disparate treatment to resident and nonresident claims. For example, assume
296. Id. at 477-78.
297. Id. at 478.
298. Vernon, supra note 242, at 297. The Restatement Second Conflict of Laws generally recognizes
a limited role for renvoi. However, the standards of the Restatement are not very helpful in resolving whether
renvoi should be employed in § 15-1-65. In § 8(2) and (3) the Restatement Second provides that the doctrine
of renvoi should be employed "when the objective of the particular choice-of-law rule is that the forum reach
the same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of another state. . . ." However, use of the
doctrine of renvoi is constrained by "considerations of practicality and feasibility." Considering that renvoi
would be an unnecessarily complicating factor for courts applying § 15-1-65, its use should be rejected on
the grounds of practicality and feasibility.
299. The Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act (U.L.A.) § 3, provides:
If the statute of limitations of another state applies to the assertion of a claim in this State, the
other state's relevant statutes and other rules of law governing tolling and accrual apply in computing
the limitation period, but its statutes and other rules of law governing conflict of laws do not apply.
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that a resident and nonresident have identical claims against a person subject
to the jurisidiction of Mississippi, which accrued in a state with a limitations
period longer than Mississippi's. The nonresident will have the benefit of the
longer period of limitations, while the resident will have the burden of the limitations period of this state. In this case, of course, should the resident need the
benefit of the longer statute of limitations of the state where his claim accrued,
he has an incentive to commence his action in that state. On the other hand,
if the hypothetical example is changed so that the claims of the resident and
nonresident accrued in a state with a shorter statute of limitations than Mississippi, then the resident will have the benefit, denied nonresidents, of Mississippi's longer limitations period. In this circumstance it is the nonresident who
is given an incentive to take his claim to the courts of the state where it accrued.
Disparate treatment given residents and nonresidents has been unsuccessfully challenged on the grounds that such treatment denies the nonresident equal
protection and the privileges and immunities assured to the citizens of the several
states. Long standing United States Supreme Court precedent established in Canadian Northern Railway v. Eggen 300 provides that exceptions in borrowing statutes which apply the law of the forum only to claims of residents do not deny
a nonresident constitutional privileges and immunities. The Supreme Court's
more recent interpretations of the privileges and immunities clause do not cast
doubt on the continuing validity of its holding in Eggen. 301
Various equal protection challenges to borrowing statutes have also failed.
For instance, the exception providing for the application of the forum limitations period only to the claims of residents arising out of state has been upheld
by the supreme courts of both Idaho 30 and Illinois. 303 Both courts held that
the distinction between residents and nonresidents did not create a suspect classification and that the distinction was rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal of preventing forum shopping. In Pusquilian v. Cedar Point,
Inc. 304 a resident defendant challenged the Michigan borrowing statute which
had an exception for claims of resident plaintiffs arising out of state but not
for claims against resident defendants arising out of state. That equal protection challenge likewise failed on the ground that the distinction between resident plaintiffs and defendants was rationally related to the goal behind the statute
of preventing forum shopping. 305
The exception in section 15-1-65 for claims of resident plaintiffs likewise is
constitutional. The exception does create the possibility that resident plaintiffs
will get the benefit or burden of Mississippi law and, therefore, receive treat300. 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
301. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518 (1978); Baldwinv. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
302. Miller v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 99 Idaho 299, 581 P.2d 345 (1978).
303. Miller v. Lockett, 98 11. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983).
304. 41 Mich. App. 399, 200 N.W.2d 489 (1972).
305. Id. at 492.
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ment different from nonresidents with identical claims accruing out of state.
The exception is consistent with the purpose behind the statute of reducing forum shopping and is rationally related to that end. Also, it should be noted that
some distinction as to residents whose claims accrued out of state is inevitable
under borrowing statutes. Without the exception contained in section 15-1-65,
Mississippi's borrowing statute would treat residents with claims accruing out
of state like nonresidents with similar claims. However, treating residents with
out-of-state claims thusly would distinguish between resident plaintiffs with outof-state claims and resident plaintiffs with claims accruing in state. Without
the exception, resident plaintiffs would be distinguished based on where their
claims accrued; with the exception, resident plaintiffs are treated alike, and unlike
nonresidents whose claims accrue out of state.
E. Effective Date of Reform
Section 7 of H.B. 1171 provides that the amendments are applicable only
to claims accruing after July 1, 1989. Therefore, amended section 15-1-65 may
only be applicable to claims which accrued out of state after July 1, 1989. A
plaintiff whose claim accrued out of state and then became barred by the law
of the state where the claim accrued (under a statute of limitations shorter than
six years) can still argue that the claim may be commenced in Mississippi under old section 15-1-49, the catchall statute of limitations. Essentially, the plaintiffs argument in this situation will be that Shewbrooks and the old six-year
catch-all statute of limitations remain good law as to all out-of-state claims which
accrued prior to July 1, 1989. As to those claims, the old borrowing statute
controls, so borrowing will seldom be required and the old catchall statute of
limitations will be applied. If this interpretation is accepted for the amended
borrowing statute, the effectiveness of that statute in reducing the number of
out-of-state claims will be delayed for some number of years.
It is noteworthy that while the literal language of section 7 in H.B. 1171 appears to delay the effectiveness of the amended borrowing statute, such delay
is not compelled by supreme court precedent. As noted earlier, the Mississippi
Supreme Court consistently has held that the legislature lacks authority to reduce
the period of limitations on claims which have vested in this state. That doctrine has no applicability to claims arising or accruing out of state. A claim
accruing out of state before July 1, 1989, presumably could have been brought
in another forum, at least in the courts where the claim accrued. In cases where
the claim accrued under the laws of another state and then became barred by
the statute of limitations of that state, barring the claim under section 15-1-65
in this state can hardly be said to be shortening the period of limitations on
a vested claim or right. No stretch of legal logic can make a claim barred elsewhere a vested right within the meaning of Mississippi's law of limitations. Therefore, all out-of-state claims could be subject to the amended provisions of section
15-1-65 but for the language of section 7 apparently delaying the effectiveness
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of the amended borrowing statute. Unless the supreme court interprets the words
"causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1989" in section 7 of H.B. 1171
to mean "causes of action accruing in Mississippi after July 1, 1989," the borrowing statute will not be effective to reduce the number of out-of-state claims
filed in Mississippi courts for some number of years.
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of amending three of Mississippi's statutes of limitations is to
reduce the number of older claims filed in Mississippi and so to give defendants more favorable treatment in civil actions than they enjoyed prior to these
amendments. Certainly, the amendments to three statutes of limitations will
reduce claims frequency because there is a direct relationship between reducing periods of limitations and reducing the number of claims filed. However,
because the amended provisions of at least two of the statutes, section 15-1-36
and section 15-1-49, will not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to
July 1, 1989, the effectiveness of these two statutes to reduce claims frequency
will not be soon realized. On the other hand, section 15-1-65 could apply to
all claims arising out of state, no matter when they accrued. If thus interpreted,
that provision should immediately begin to reduce the number of claims accruing out of state and filed in state and federal courts in Mississippi. However,
such an interpretation, while useful in reducing the number of foreign claims
filed in Mississippi, comports better with the policy behind the amended borrowing statute than it does with the literal language of provisions of H.B. 1171,
which delays the effectiveness of its provisions. If amended section 15-1-65
is applicable only to foreign claims accruing after July 1, 1989, its effect, like
that of amended sections 15-1-36 and 15-1-49, will not be realized for some years.
Whether or not section 15-1-65 is applied to all foreign claims accruing after
July 1, 1989, reduction of catchall statutes of limitations and creation of an effective borrowing statute eventually will reduce the number of filings of claims
which accrued out-of-state. Together, those provisions will eliminate the incentive to bring to Mississippi claims which had no connection to this state and
which, but for the application of Mississippi's long statute of limitations, would
not have been commenced in Mississippi. By reducing the incentive for forum
shopping, the legislature has fashioned legislation which should reduce caseloads
in state and federal courts in Mississippi, while increasing fairness to defendants by not giving them exposure beyond that provided by the jurisidiction
where the claim accrued. This will save Mississippi taxpayers the cost of subsidizing justice for out-of-state claimants, which should more than offset the
loss to those persons whose interests have been served by allowing out-of-state
claimants to dump claims in Mississippi courts.
Although overall these statutory changes favor the interests of defendants in
security at the expense of plaintiffs, these amendments are not entirely one sid-

19891

LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

ed. Section 15-1-36, in particular, continues to give plaintiffs some advantage
in health care malpractice litigation which is not enjoyed by other plaintiffs.
Also, given loopholes in these statutes, particularly the possible inapplicability
of section 15-1-36 to malpractice claims which sound in contract and the inapplicability of section 15-1-49 to product liability claims which sound in breach
of warranty, plaintiffs may be able to avoid effect of these statutes by artful
pleading. Whether such tactical pleading will be tolerated is an open question.
Certainly, the express language of section 15-1-36 and section 15-1-49 limits
the applicability of these statutes. If the legislature intended these amended statutes to have a broader scope, it could have so provided by express language.
Challenges to these statutes are expected and should be unsuccessful. Section 15-1-36 should pass muster under state and federal constitutional analysis.
However, sections 15-1-36 and section 15-1-65 are sufficiently ambiguous to
make disputes regarding their interpretations likely. Of course, statutes of limitations should provide some certainty to litigants regarding the periods of time
in which claims must be brought and after which claims are barred. Until these
statutes are interpreted by Mississippi courts, they will provide little certainty
to litigants and their counsel.
This uncertainty is an unfortunate by-product of the manner in which these
statutes were drafted. One gets the sense that in order to forge a coalition capable of adopting these reforms, potential problems with these statutes were left
unidentified. Interpretive problems not identified are not debated and thus may
not be obstacles to adopting the reforms. Ignoring problems of how these statutes are to operate may be a precondition to their adoption at all. However,
the result of such legislative inattentiveness is that these statutes will provide
little certainty to litigants and counsel until given extensive interpretation by
the courts.

